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# MILITARY OBSERVATIONS

RESPECTING

# IRELAND,

ITS

## *Attack and Defence,*

AND TO SHEW THAT AT ALL EVENTS,

PROPERTY SHOULD BE ARMED TO RESIST

PLUNDER AND ANARCHY.

*Interspersed with some Political Remarks.*

Trop compter sur sa force, est un trait d'imprudence.

Dublin:

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# ADVERTISEMENT.

*THESE observations were written eighteen months ago, and formed a ſection of a larger work on the State of Ireland, which has not been finiſhed. Soon after the breaking out of the preſent war, what is here ſubmitted to the Public was copied, and given to a perſon in office, in caſe the Government ſhould think any part of it worth attending to. As we are threatened by an ambitious enemy, and as every man, from the peaſant to the peer, is in fact intereſted in defending Ireland againſt conqueſt or plunder, theſe hints on its defence are, with all humility, offered to his country, by*

AN OFFICER OF THE LINE.

*Dublin, March,* 1804.

# MILITARY

# OBSERVATIONS, &c.

I SHALL chiefly confine myſelf to ſome general remarks, but Detail muſt be entered into in a few inſtances. Several pamphlets have been publiſhed on this ſubject. I have only ſeen two worth any attention. One of them, ſaid to be written by Col. K———, recommends a ſyſtem of cordons for the defence of Ireland: this, I confeſs, I do not approve of. A cordon may anſwer very well on a frontier ſuch as Bohemia or Saxony have, and on that of Sileſia, or on the Rhine from Hunningen to Treves and Luxemburgh; from near Venice, along the Po, to Mantua and Tortona, (which would be very extenſive) or, in ſhort, in any of thoſe countries where the inhabitants are with the cordon; where there are regular fortifications to ſupport an army; where the art of war has been for centuries practiſed,

on a regular ſyſtem, and where every paſs and poſition is perfectly underſtood; but I do not think it applicable to Ireland.

Ireland, though naturally ſtrong, is a very open country, no foreſts, no regular fortifications: Its bogs, though great, are paſſable to infantry, and its rivers are not large. The majority of the inhabitants (all the lower orders) are inimical to the defending army (the Engliſh), and attached to the invaders (the French).

Under ſuch circumſtances, if a ſtrong column advances with rapidity on the capital, what becomes of your cordon, extended fifty miles, when you have no fortreſs to ſupport it, or to check the enemy, and where the people are againſt you? There are many excellent remarks, and good hints, in the book I allude to, but I think the Colonel entirely miſtaken, in reſting the defence of Ireland upon a ſyſtem of cordons.

Another pamphlet on the defence of Ireland, publiſhed in 1797, at No. 15, Parliament-ſtreet, by G. Johnſton, but without the author's name, contains excellent military obſervations; the author

(I do

(I do not know who he is) begins by ſaying, *Ne ſutor ultra crepidam*, but the obſervation will not apply to himſelf, for he has not taken up another man's laſt—he has taken up a laſt he is well uſed to. This Gentleman's remarks are, in my opinion, excellent, and though I do not entirely approve of his ſyſtem of defence, I think his book, on the whole, contains excellent precepts; he enters alſo into a detail of our wants, and points out remedies to various abuſes. Indeed, ſince the publication, many of his hints have been attended to: he, however, does not ſeem to have been perfectly acquainted with the ſtate of the country at the time he wrote.

As we have no chance, I fear, in this new century, of ſeeing the peace of Abbe St. Pierre, we muſt allow the truth of an obſervation of this author, viz. "The military profeſſion, whatever may be ſaid to the contrary, is the guardian and the bulwark of every ſtate, and is the field, wherein true glory can be acquired." And I think it may be ſet down as an axiom, that every country in Europe muſt become more military than it has been, and that they will every day become more and more ſo, until ſome new

ſyſtem of compromiſe, (neither aboliſhing all ancient uſages, or ſupporting all ancient follies and corruptions) takes place, with the general conſent of Europe.

Such obſervations, it may be ſaid, do not apply to Ireland, but I ſay they do; for whether France becomes an imperial military country, or rather continues one, and in a few years extends her dominion as much as Rome did in former times; or whether ſtrange viciſſitudes of human events ſhould deſtroy her preſent ſituation, reſtore royalty, and confine her to her ancient territory, or that all Europe ſhould think it their intereſt to modify abuſes, and enter on a new treaty of ſocial compact; the princes with their ſubjects; and the different ſtates with each other; all apply to Ireland, as much as to any other country—perhaps in no part of Europe is there a more military people, or more aware of their ſituation and of that of Europe. The probability is, that England and France will not continue at peace many years, and though it is aſtoniſhing that neither England or France ſeem to have been hitherto aware of the importance of Ireland, yet it is now ſo obvious, that on a new war there can be

be no doubt, but the one will attack, and the other defend this country: of courſe, Ireland will become the ſeat of war for a ſhort time. In writing on all ſuch ſubjects one can only argue on probabilities. Before I proceed to hazard a military opinion, I ſhall obſerve further on the ſecond book I mention. **Ne ſutor ultra crepidam,* is perfectly aware of the want of improvement in our diſcipline; indeed, almoſt all his remarks are ſo juſt, that I refer the reader to the pamphlet, ſtrongly recommending it to every man who wiſhes to be informed on the military wants of the country, to read from page 25 to 50. I have ſaid that I differ with this author in ſome reſpects, as to his ſyſtem of defence; it is therefore right, that I ſhould mention in what.

He ſays, to defend Ireland will require 40,000 effective men. This force I look on as totally inadequate to its defence, attacked by 25,000 French, and moſt likely they would not attempt it with leſs.—He proceeds to ſay, give battle to the enemy on *no account.* This I do not approve of, for many reaſons. He ſays, haraſs the enemy with

* For diſtinction I thus allude to the pamphlet, not knowing the author's name.

with ſkirmiſhes—this would do very well in a country where the inhabitants were even neutral, but where many are diſaffected, I fear it will not do. The King of Pruſſia ſays, "*Celui qui fait la guerre en detail, ſera toujours battû.*" One of the maxims of N. S. U. Crepidam, I cannot ſufficiently admire or impreſs on the government, viz. "Eſtabliſh regular diſcipline in your army, for neither Pruſſian or Auſtrian will do in regiments commanded by mere gentlemen of fortune, with ſerjeants who return them to Parliament." In this work the cordon ſyſtem of Colonel K—— is alſo anſwered, viz. page 171 and 172. In fact, a cordon in Ireland, on the model of Dalton's, during the Bavarian war in 1778, would not anſwer. In that country, thick woods, mountains, fortifications, innumerable paſſes, and the population neutral, may juſtify a cordon; but in Ireland, which is ſo interſected with fine roads, an open country, and ſome of the inhabitants againſt the defending army, the caſe is entirely different; and it certainly would be wonderful, if a cordon of fifty thouſand men could defend the Shannon againſt half the number marching in one or two columns to the capital. There is, however, a great deal of uſeful military information

information in Colonel K——'s pamphlet, and other remarks, worth the attention of Government. He juſtly obſerves, page 80, "The country is wretched indeed, where ninety-nine in a hundred feel, that no change or revolution can make them worſe or more miſerable than they actually are."

We muſt hope, that the Britiſh navy may always be miſtreſs of the ſeas, but even this circumſtance ſhould be conſidered; and that conſideration brings us to reflect on the poſſibility of ſuch a nation as France being able to create a formidable navy. In the year 1665, Lewis XIV. had but *one* fireſhip in Breſt, and the entire marine of France did not amount to thirty frigates; in 1672 (ſeven years) France had ſixty ſhips of the line, and forty frigates; and, in ten years after, France had 198 ſhips of war.—— (Voltaire, Hiſt. Louis XIV.)

I muſt alſo remark, that Spain and Holland have been great naval powers, and may be ſo again; and it is to be lamented that theſe countries are entirely in the French intereſt.

The

The Northern Powers have alſo men of war, and ſeemed, before the victory of Copenhagen, diſpoſed to French connexion; ſo that we may have a formidable naval force to contend with; but, allowing the empire of the ſea to continue in Britain, it does not ſecure Ireland from invaſion.

Ignorance and folly may think as they pleaſe, but the operations of a fleet depend on the winds, and therefore muſt be uncertain; of this we have many inſtances; how near were the French ſucceeding in the Bantry bay expedition? It is alſo to be obſerved, that the winds that are favorable for a fleet to ſail from Breſt for Ireland, would keep the Engliſh fleet in port.

Before I take leave of the two pamphlets I have mentioned, I muſt recommend it to every one to read again and again, the note at the latter end (from page 78 to 81) of *Ne ſutor ultra crepidam.*

And an obſervation in Colonel K——'s, on Ireland, viz. " That ſmall ſpot is probably more eſſential, not merely to the conſequence, but to the

the very exiſtence of England, than all the foreign poſſeſſions, to retain or acquire which ſhe has been laviſhing her blood and treaſure, and accumulating debt upon her landed property for a century, and perhaps the importance of Ireland to her ſiſter kingdom will never be felt till it falls into the hands of an enemy."

I muſt likewiſe obſerve, that at the latter end of the pamphlet, N. S. U. Crepidam; he ſays, "he has taken for granted that the French, on their landing, will *not* be joined by the people", otherwiſe, he propoſes an oppoſite plan.—Affairs being then deſperate, he by all means recommends to collect force, advance on the enemy, and after having accuſtomed the troops to ſome days fire, put the fate of Ireland to the deciſion of a battle. Situated as Ireland is, I think it neceſſary to attack the enemy inſtantly, but even in this caſe, I am not for putting all to the ſtake of one battle; I would have ſomething more in reſerve. The beſt generals and the beſt troops have been beaten, and that without the entire loſs of a country. In war, various accidents cauſe unexpected reverſes, and though I ſhould look on the loſs of Dublin, or the loſs of a battle as very de-

trimental, I think a General ſhould ſtill remain in the country, till abſolutely driven out, for he might in turn take advantage of circumſtances. Battles are often gained or loſt by accident, which the military hiſtory of the world proves.

Fountenoy was at firſt loſt by the French, though the Engliſh army, at the time the enemy gave way, was in diſorder, which an officer who was in the battle (the late Colonel Fraſer of the *Royals*) told me; and that the famous Engliſh column ſo ſpoken of by hiſtorians, was *abſolutely* a column of confuſion. They, however, ſtill advanced, and the victory appeared certain, when the allies by a mere accident were beat. On this, Marſhal Saxe obſerved to Louis XV, who was preſent, "*Vous voyes, Sire, a qua tiennent les battailles.*" I have, therefore, differed from N. S. U. Crepidam; for my object is, under all circumſtances to have ſuch a plan of defence as ſhould meet, as far as poſſible, the misfortune of loſing a battle, or two. I muſt, however, beg pardon for differing in any reſpect from the opinion of a gentleman, whoſe obſervations prove him to be an excellent officer, and which are full of military information.

I now

I now proceed to offer my ſentiments on our defence. I have heard many military men give it as their opinion that the affairs of Ireland, in the event of invaſion, would be decided in one campaign, and others, that the war would laſt ſeveral; I do not believe either opinions, for the following reaſons:

Firſt, becauſe Ireland is a very different country now, from what it was a hundred years ago. At that time England was a more military nation than Ireland, which with a ſmall population, was a miſerable, conquered, and oppreſſed country. Great part of this picture is now reverſed. England a rich, luxurious, and powerful country, with as much individual and national ſpirit as ever, has not that hardy race of peaſantry that we have, nor could ſhe poſſibly recruit her armies without the aſſiſtance of Ireland and Scotland.* Ireland is now a military country, full of people, as brave and as hardy a race as any in Europe, and they have no idea of luxury. They

* The hardieſt of the Engliſh prefer the *ſea* to the military ſervice; and it would be impolitic and difficult to change this diſpoſition.

They alſo know, (and poſitively ſpeak of it with exultation,) that "*full half of the army that drove the French out of Egypt, were Iriſh.*"* Therefore ſuch a country could not be conquered in one campaign.

Secondly, becauſe many of the lower orders are diſcontented, which with the unfortunate diviſions of the country, might make it difficult to defeat an invading army (as might be done in a more united country) in one campaign; at the ſame time the miſeries of war, and the *requiſitions* of a French army, would moſt likely after a firſt campaign, prove to all the people the folly of neutrality; and how much it became their intereſt to oppoſe the French, a truth the early conviction of which, would prevent ſuch a conteſt from being continued beyond two campaigns.

I am

* The penal laws enacted by the Whigs in the Reigns of King William and Queen Anne, particularly in the latter, deprived us of many excellent officers. Some of the beſt generals in the Auſtrian, French, and Spaniſh ſervices during the laſt century, were natives of Ireland or their deſcendants. But it is fair to mention, King William never broke the articles of Limerick.

I am alſo perſuaded that many perſons in Ireland would now take arms againſt the French, who could not have been got beyond a neutrality four years ago. A variety of cauſes might be aſſigned for this; ſome thought that the meaſures purſued by government, or under their authority, as well previouſly to rebellion as after it had commenced, tended conſiderably to produce irritation; others were out of humour at the meaſure of Union; and unfortunately reſentment and paſſion too often triumph over reaſon wherever they come in contact. But this change in the diſpoſition of Ireland makes it probable, that ſuch a conteſt would not be continued beyond a ſecond campaign. Theſe are my political reaſons; and I muſt obſerve, that it would be abſurd to deny the real ſtate of this country; it is on that I found my opinion; and in ſuch caſes, when we conſider the actual ſtate of a country, all we can do is to argue on reaſonable probability.

But there are alſo military reaſons why ſuch a conteſt would, in all likelihood, be neither concluded in one, or extended beyond two campaigns: viz. Ireland, as I have obſerved, is a ſtrong,

ſtrong, though an open country, and the ditches and diviſions make every field almoſt a little entrenchment*. The natives would have great advantage in ſuch warfare, and if once a landing was effected, poſſibly the future ſtate of this country depends on the event of the firſt and ſecond battle. If the Engliſh army was to gain them, I look on the buſineſs as over, before in fact, a campaign was well commenced. If they loſt them, I then believe many of the diſaffected would riſe; but as England could not give up Ireland on the loſs of two battles, without making further efforts, then a campaign follows. In ſuch a caſe, the loſs of a battle would be a great calamity; and if England recovered and gained in turn ſome advantages, yet ſhe could ſcarcely get rid of 25,000 French, and double the number (poſſibly four times the number) of Iriſh without a ſecond campaign.

If

* It may ſeem a contradiction to ſay a country is open, and yet that every field is *encloſed*. Speaking as a farmer would do, Ireland is not an open country, on the contrary, few are ſo encloſed; but by *open*, in a military view, I mean that it has no foreſts, no fortreſſes, no impaſſable bogs or moraſſes, to ſtop the progreſs of an army, no rivers of difficulty, and it is interſected with excellent roads, therefore to ſpeak correctly it is *open*, though its fields are encloſed.

If the French gained a victory and marched on, it cannot be denied, that they would find recruits enough every mile they advanced; they therefore, (we ſuppoſe,) arrive at and take the capital; and here I muſt obſerve, that in ſuch a caſe, many men though loyally diſpoſed, when they found their property at ſtake, would join the ſucceſsful party, and being once committed with them muſt then go on. N. S. U. Crepidam, ſays he, is not over anxious to retain a capital.* Capitals I allow have been loſt, and might be ſo half a dozen times in other countries, without the country being loſt, but not ſo in Ireland. For inſtance, if a large French force ſhould land in Suſſex, it might march rapidly on London, and even burn half of it. I agree the deſtruction and loſs would be very great, but England is not loſt by that; for in England the people are anti-French, and I think it is poſſible that a French army by favourable circumſtances and rapid movements might take London, plunder it, and yet not a man of them ever return to France, but as exchanged priſoners. The ſame will apply to Berlin, which was twice taken in the ſeven years war, without any

* He allows that we have ſeen the beſt affected people join the conquerors after a victory.

any very great inconvenience to the King of Pruſſia. But different circumſtances make different caſes, and I look on it, that if Dublin was once in poſſeſſion of 20,000 French troops, joined by the maſs of the people, as they certainly would be; England would find it very difficult to retain Ireland. However, as the variety of intereſts, national and individual, concerned in preventing the French from conquering or fraternizing us, are ſo great, it is not to be ſuppoſed, that even in ſuch a caſe, England would give up Ireland on one campaign. Her affairs muſt be bad indeed if ſhe had not ſome *point de ralliament* left. This point would depend on the point of Invaſion, but there are many in Ireland, to which the Anglo-Iriſh army and thoſe who ſupported it, might according to circumſtances retreat; and if the Engliſh fleet continued ſuperior, and free of mutiny, reinforcements might be thrown in, and the war might be continued a ſecond campaign.—I ſhall now mention ſome of the beſt poſitions in the ſuppoſition that England did not give up, on the loſs of the capital. But I think war would not be prolonged beyond a ſecond campaign, for if England then conquered, there would be an end, and if *beaten* in two campaigns, I am of

ſitions,

of opinion ſhe would be ſo much embarraſſed, that it would be very difficult to try a third; and therefore I differ from thoſe who ſay, it would be a very ſhort or a very long conteſt. England could not give up Ireland without a great ſtruggle, but if beaten for two campaigns, I confeſs I doubt the poſſibility of a third; it cannot be ſuppoſed that England would give up Ireland on one campaign. There might be diviſions and wants after even a *firſt* ſucceſsful campaign on the the part of a French army contending for the dominion of Ireland, which might give England great advantages the *ſecond*.

There are ſome good poſitions of retreat for the Engliſh army, (if driven to it) on which they ought to make a ſtand; which of them, the general ſhould occupy, muſt depend on circumſtances; but, I repeat, there are ſome excellent poſitions of this deſcription, north, ſouth, eaſt, and weſt, therefore one of them muſt be applicable to almoſt any caſe of invaſion.

Firſt, on the north-eaſt, the counties of Antrim and Down might be well occupied and defended—put the right at Coleraine, the left

at Newry, a number of gun-boats and armed veſſels on lough Neagh; the Newry canal, the lough, and the river Ban,* make a frontier to defend, while Strangford, Carrickfergus, and Carlingford Bay, are open to the Engliſh fleet to bring ſuccours.

In the ſouth and ſouth-weſt, I would occupy the line from Limerick to Youghall. Cork, Bantry, Kinſale, are open to the Engliſh fleet.

In the weſt, fortify and garriſon Galway; have armed veſſels on Lough Corrib, continue a line of defence to Clew bay, or, if ſtrong enough, occupy the mountains and paſſes as far as Killalla. Galway, and other excellent ports, are open to the Engliſh fleet; and this is really a line for a cordon, being very ſtrong by nature, and well flanked.

The eaſt, which, on account of the capital, would be a more deſirable object for Government to make a ſtand on, is the weakeſt. I do not conceive that it affords any extent of country with

* The Ban is not a river of much importance, though, with the other points mentioned, it would aſſiſt the frontier.

with a good line of defence, there may be good poſitions, for a mere day of battle, but not any for a defeated army to form a cordon of defence on, till it ſhould be ſuccoured from another country. Such as the country affords would be as follows; occupy the County Dublin and Wicklow mountains, keep Drogheda on the right, and ſeize every ſtrong poſition on the coaſt, ſuch as Howth, Bray Head, Wicklow Head; and England, to pour in troops in ſmall craft from Liverpool, Parkgate, and Wales.

Here are three excellent and one middling po-ſi-
tion, in caſe an Engliſh army ſhould be diſ-treſſed: three others likewiſe offer, ſo that it is impoſſible that Ireland can be conquered in one campaign, if the army do their duty, even ſup-poſing the fatality of the capital being loſt.*

The county Wexford affords one; the river Slaney on the right or eaſt; the Barrow on the

 left,

* There are a number of very ſtrong poſitions fit for ſmaller cordons to be found in Ulſter, Munſter, and Connaught. I think Leinſter the weakeſt province. The County Wicklow mountains certainly afford ſtrong poſts, and have faſtneſſes in which banditti may make a ſtand, (as we have ſeen) but a large body of troops could not be ſubſiſted in thoſe wild deſert regions.

left, and an entrenched camp between Leighlin-Bridge, and Tallagh; Wexford, Bannon Bay, and Ballylaigh Bay, are open to ſuccours.

Another in a manner iſolated territory is the county Clare, put the right at Limerick or Killaloe, the left at Oranmore, Galway, or Clare Galway. Galway Bay and the Shannon are open to reinforcements. The next, which makes the ſeventh ſuch poſition, is from Donegall to Derry; it is no very extenſive frontier, covers Donegall, has many ports open to aſſiſtance, viz. Derry, Lough Swilly, Donegall Bay, Killibegs; in fact from Derry to Lifford, the river renders the poſition ſtrong, and the mountains from thence to Donegall would afford excellent poſts.

All this, I am aware, is on the cordon ſyſtem, which I before ſaid, I diſapproved of, and ſo I do, when on ſuch on extenſive ſcale, as recommended by Col. K——, in an open country; but theſe are ſmaller cordons, and in very ſtrong countries. They are in fact, rather a line of entrenchments to cover a certain diſtrict of country, for all ſhould be ſecured with field-works; and are only propoſed in caſe of great neceſſity, ſuppoſing

ſuppoſing the Grand Army ſhould be unfortunately defeated; and not to be had recourſe to, in the firſt inſtance.*

I think Ireland would require 70,000 men, (in caſe of a war,) to defend her, beſides her Yeomanry.

As there are ſo many places where an enemy could land, and as it is impoſſible to know the exact point he might land at, my plan of defence would be one grand army in the centre at

* I alſo mention them as embracing ſome extent of territory, and as points where the loyal inhabitants might join the army and make a ſtand, act on the defenſive and wait the poſſibility of favourable circumſtances. If an army is ſo reduced that it cannot defend any ſuch line of country, I ſhould look on it as nearly conquered. No doubt, the general ought to avail himſelf of the beſt poſitions theſe lines of defence afforded. I muſt alſo obſerve, that unleſs a line of troops covers a country of ſome extent, I cannot conſider it as a cordon. It may be ſaid, ſuch lines of country as are pointed out here, would require 50,000 men to defend; and that with ſuch an army, why retreat on any point? I anſwer, a great army may be defeated and obliged to retreat, and it is poſſible, that if there was a general riſing in a country, even a large army might be ſurrounded and compelled to ſurrender, it might therefore be proper to confine itſelf to the defence of a particular diſtrict.

at Athlone, a corps de reſerve near Dublin, a force in the ſouth and at Cork, and one in the north, beſides ſtrong garriſons at particular points. But the troops ſhould have poſitive orders not to fight in detail; the diſtribution ſhould be ſuch, that they might be mutually appuyed, and their orders ſhould be either to fall back, or wait aſſiſtance according to circumſtances.*

A ſyſtem of Telegraphs is more neceſſary for Ireland, (and they muſt be properly guarded,) than any other country; for perhaps a great deal might depend on the quickneſs of intelligence, at leaſt we ſhould have great advantage from it. I have ſaid that 70,000 men are neceſſary to defend Ireland, and to military men, the beſt explanation of my propoſed method will be to give the detail, and if any other perſon has curioſity, ſome military friend will explain it to him if thought worth the trouble.

I mean

* Whenever an enemy advanced, the Yeomanry of the neareſt counties ſhould join the army in a body; they would be uſeful as light and irregular troops, and particularly ſo as guides.

I mean 70,000 men, beſides the Yeomanry, and well appointed; to produce this number, the returns of the army, muſt at leaſt reach 85,000 men; and this force, I think, ſhould be placed in Ireland on the commencement of a war, if England means to keep the country.

But to ſpeak of the defence.—In the firſt place, it ſhould be a moſt poſitive order, never to be broken, (except in the caſe pointed out in the laſt note) that no yeoman ſhould ever march out of his own barony; an officer of the line, ſhould be appointed to command the yeomanry in every county. The duty of theſe corps ſhould be to keep the peace in their baronies and pariſhes. To guard the magazines, having a few troops of the line alſo on this duty, to eſcort proviſions, ſtores, ammunition, and priſoners, and to carry expreſs diſpatches and orders *through*, but never *beyond* their barony.

As every barony would have at leaſt one yeomanry corps, and being chiefly to preſerve the peace, and keep the lower orders in bounds, they ſhould take all that duty, and not be put on any other;

other; thus the army would be free to act againſt the enemy, and the yeomanry would be enabled to preſerve tranquillity, and check riſings in their diſtricts.

There are 250 baronies in Ireland; each might very well have a corps of cavalry, of thirty men, and two companies of infantry of fifty men each. This would conſtitute in total.

| | |
|---|---|
| Cavalry, - - | 7,500 |
| Infantry, - - | 25,000 |
| Dublin, Cork, and other large towns could alſo have corps which might be eſtimated at the leaſt, at - - | 4,000 |
| Total, | 36,500 men,* |

(of

* I conceive the eſtabliſhment of that uſeful body the yeomanry, has been puſhed too far. A great number of ſmall unconnected corps, would be found (like the hords of Indian troops) to be in each others way, and eaſily defeated by a ſmaller *compact* army; at the ſame time when on permanent duty, they coſt as much as troops of the line. I prefer the above numbers, and theſe ſhould be ſelected from the youngeſt and moſt active men. Let all the reſt join the town corps I have propoſed (without pay) for the more local defence of property. From this ſyſtem being ſo extended, the recruiting ſervice is alſo much injured.

(of which 7,500 are cavalry), for the police of the country, &c. This will, I think, ſhew that the means of defence, if properly uſed, are by no means contemptible. I ſtate the *pro* and *con.*

A government is never in ſo good a ſtate of defence, as when it has the affections of the people.—It is to be lamented that in Ireland the people have no affection for the government, though they may, in ſome inſtances, like and reſpect the perſons who exercife that government, as in the caſe of Lord Hardwicke at preſent.

The inſtant a landing takes place, the yeomanry corps ſhould be placed on permanent duty; the officer of the line commanding them, ſhould make proper diſtribution of the cavalry on the line of *road* communicating with the capital and any of the armies. A guard ſhould be placed in the chief town of the barony; another (in a temporary redoubt which might be eaſily thrown up, if there was no good houſe or old caſtle near, &c.) to guard any paſs or bridge, which inſurgents might throw

down, or block up; and a ſmall detatchment at the boundaries of each barony where the principal high road paſſed. I am certain that ſuch a diſtribution could be made as would enable the yeomanry to do the baronial duty I have pointed out, without any extraordinary fatigue.

In reſpect to the attack of Ireland, I ſhall only mention ſome few circumſtances, as connected with its defence: that thoſe who are intereſted in the defence, may, if theſe pages ever fall into their hands, be in ſome degree prepared for it. The French probably know the weak points of the country as well as the Engliſh do, and as they have avowedly ſome as able officers as any age ever produced, it would be preſumption to ſuppoſe they did not know how to attack ſuch a country as Ireland. But were it otherwiſe, it would not be my intention or intereſt to point out any ſyſtem of attack which they might avail themſelves of. I have ſome ideas on that ſubject, as well as on the defence; but further than what muſt be notorious to almoſt any one, ſhall be ſilent.

What

What I think there can be no impropriety in mentioning, is, that I presume an invading army would act with rapidity,—that it would land on the shortest line from the capital, that would admit of a landing,—that it would bring money and pay for ever thing,—at *first*,—that it would treat the peasantry with all possible kindness—that it would observe the most rigid discipline—that it would move forward towards Dublin directly, and attack the English army as soon as possible, and if victorious, follow it up.

They would certainly embody the peasantry, though not in too great numbers at first, would incorporate others of them into their own demi-brigades, and they would certainly distribute arms amongst the natives.—That if they succeeded in marching to Dublin, they would then demand every man to act, (no neutrality could be admitted by either side) they would organize what they would call a republic, discipline the people, and prepare for to act against whatever English force remained in the country. These are the obvious consequences of an attack, and indeed must be the general principle

principle on which the attack of Ireland would be conducted. But, if once France effected the conqueſt, ſhe would exact heavy contributions, and the peaſantry would find when too late the conſequences of an alliance with France, and the mockery of what they call liberty and equality.

This is a very proper place to conſider the conduct of France to other nations, and which gives a rational criterion to form an opinion on, of what her conduct would be here; but as it would interrupt the narrative of our defence, by too great a digreſſion, I ſhall ſtate it ſeparately at the end of the pamphlet.

*Defence.*

To produce 70,000 fighting men, you muſt have at leaſt 85,000 on your returns.* This force is not too much, conſidering the actual ſtate of Ireland, and the propriety of not leaving any thing to chance, and as it would enſure the defeat of *any force* the French can ſend here.

Our

* At leaſt one fifth of the groſs numbers of any army may be deducted for *ſick men*, idlers, and attendants, who, under ſome pretence or other, avoid duty. 70,000 effective men is the ſmalleſt number that could expect to defend Ireland.

Our army ſhould be ſo ſtationed, (as has already been obſerved) that any point of Ireland could be defended in a few days. Attention ſhould alſo be paid to the quartering the troops in ſuch proportions as the towns will bear and ſo as they may be fed.

Immediately on a war, I would ſtation the 85,000 men as follows,—encamping them in ſummer,—cantonments in ſaid towns in winter.

| | | Number of Men. |
|---|---|---|
| Grand Army, Centre of Ireland, 21,000. | Mullingar, | 1500 |
| | Longford, | 1500 |
| | Granard, | 1500 |
| | Laneſborough, | 1500 |
| | Athlone, | 7000 |
| | Banagher, | 1500 |
| | Birr, | 1500 |
| | Philipſtown, | 1000 |
| | Kilbeggan, | 1000 |
| | Advance Guard at Ballinaſloe, | 3000 |
| | | 21,000 |

Trim,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Groſs Number, brought over, | | 21,000 |
| Army of Reſerve, 14,000. | Trim, | 1000 |
| | Kilcock, | 1000 |
| | Clane, | 300 |
| | Sallens, | 1200 |
| | Proſperous,* | 500 |
| | Naas, | 3000 |
| | Kilcullen, | 1500 |
| | Athy, | 1500 |
| | Monaſterevan, | 1500 |
| | Edenderry, | 500 |
| | Advance at Kildare, | 2000 |
| | | 35,000 |
| Army of the North, 10,000. | Dundalk, | 1000 |
| | Armagh, | 1500 |
| | Derry,† | 3000 |
| | Belfaſt, | 2000 |
| | Enniſkillen, | 1000 |
| | Downpatrick, | 500 |
| | Newry, | 1000 |
| | | 45,000 |
| | | Groſs |

* Detatchments at Timolin, Rathcoole, Rathangan and Caſtle-Dermott, Balitore, and Ballymore-Euſtace.

† 500 might be Omagh; it is an excellent ſituation as to its poſition, but ſo miſerable, that I doubt the poſſibility of keeping any large force there; troops could not be cantoned in ſuch a poor place, and this is too wet a climate to encamp in, during the winter months.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Groſs Number, brought over, | | 45,000 |
| Southern Army, 15,000. | In Kerry, | 1500 |
| | Kinſale and C. Fort, | 3000 |
| | Cork, | 5000 |
| | Bandon and Clonakilty, | 1500 |
| | Advance at Bantry, | 2000 |
| | Firmoy, | 2000 |
| | | 60,000 |

(And the following garriſons and poſts to be under the General commanding the army to which they are neareſt, Dublin being head-quarters of Ireland.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Dublin, | 5000 |
| Galway, | 3000 |
| Limerick, | 3000 |
| Ardfennan and Clogheen, | 500 |
| Clonmell,* | 2,500 |
| Cahir, | 1,000 |
| Caſhel and Fethard, | 400 |
| Carrick on Suir, | 400 |
| Waterford, | 600 |
| | 76,400 |

Groſs

* Detachments at Capoquin and Lifmore.

| | |
|---|---|
| Groſs number brought forward, | 76,400 |
| Duncannon Fort, | 300 |
| New Geneva, | 1,200 |
| Roſs, | 300 |
| Wexford, | 1,000 |
| Enniſcorthy, | 300 |
| Arklow, | 200 |
| Wicklow, | 300 |
| Bray, | 100 |
| On the mountain line and new military road in the County Wicklow, | 1,500 |
| Drogheda, | 700 |
| Carlow, | 500 |
| Leighlin-Bridge, | 200 |
| Kilkenny, | 1,000 |
| Scattery Iſland, Clare and Ennis, | 1,000 |
| | 85,000 men. |

The ſmall villages and towns *near* any of theſe points ſhould be occupied by Detachments, in order to have ſuch a number of men eaſier fed, as alſo to keep the country quiet, and ſuch detachments ſhould be changed every fortnight.

I mean

I mean 85,000 regular troops, but I claſs the militia as ſuch for a defenſive war, and I ſhould wiſh them to be as follows:

| | Men. |
|---|---|
| Infantry regiments of the Line, | 40,000 |
| Artillery - - - - | 2,000 |
| Cavalry, (chiefly light) - | 6,000 |
| Pioneers, Engineer Corps, Artificers, Waggoners, &c. - | 2,000 |
| Rifle Corps, or Light Infantry, | 4,000 |
| *Iriſh Militia, - - | 18,000 |
| Soldiers of the line trained to great guns, | 1,000 |
| Engliſh and Scotch Militia - | 12,000 |
| Groſs Number, | 85,000 |

This

* I have the higheſt opinion of the bravery of the Iriſh militia, and many of the regiments have alſo given proofs of their loyalty. It would, however, be a very great advantage to exchange the militia of the two countries. The only poſſible objection on our part, would be in an occaſional encreaſe of abſentees; this would, however, in a great meaſure be done away by the Engliſh militia coming here, as officers of rank and fortune would come with them. Another circumſtance worth conſideration is, that ſuch movements would progreſſively

This force, great as it may appear, will not produce, I include officers, &c. more than 70,000 effective men; and will be absolutely neceſſary to defend the country if an enemy ſhould land 25,000 men, and I do not imagine they would attempt it with leſs; for with a ſmaller force they could have no chance of ſucceſs. And though from the uncertainty of maritime operations, ſuch a force might poſſibly be tranſported from France to Ireland, yet as it would require at leaſt an hundred tranſports, beſides a fleet of ſhips of war, it would neceſſarily be an enterpriſe of conſiderable riſque and difficulty. At the ſame time, ſince it is not impracticable, we muſt act accordingly, and not rely entirely on the chance of their being met at ſea by any of our fleets, (on which the generality of the public are apt to place too much reliance) and certainly

progreſſively train them to military habits, and make them more likely to enliſt in the regiments of the line for general ſervice, whenever it may be thought adviſable to give them that permiſſion. I cannot ſee any thing unconſtitutional in ſuch exchange, which critical times makes at leaſt prudent.

certainly England was not till very lately, aware of the conſequences of Ireland, for during the laſt war, it was in fact in no true ſtate of defence; I ſincerely wiſh, in a future war, it may not become one of the theatres of blood; for every country has reaſon to deplore being the ſeat of war, and as one of the authors I have referred to, ſays, "perhaps it would be well "that the Iriſh mob could be convinced of the "fact, that a victorious army, and particularly "French, ſuffers no people to plunder but them-"ſelves;" and that it will at firſt protect property, in order to pillage it at leiſure; of this many countries in Europe afford very melancholy proofs. The next conſideration is the diſcipline of the army and its officers. It is to be mentioned as one of our faults, that our troops are tormented with trifling details, and never practiſed in large bodies in the great manœuvres of war. And I think there are many other defects in our Military ſyſtem, though His Royal Highneſs the Duke of York, has certainly made great improvements, and has alſo afforded protection to ſeveral deſerving and valuable officers, who otherwiſe might have been loſt to the ſervice. But we are to conſider the poſſibility of invaſion,

and ſtate the great out-lines of our deficiencies, and not (in a pamphlet of this kind) the details of Regimental abuſes. However I wiſh the troops were exerciſed frequently in as large bodies as poſſible. Suppoſing all within ten miles were occaſionally collected.

In reſpect to officers in command, thoſe of the beſt talents ſhould be ſelected for Ireland; men of moderate and conciliatory tempers who will not drive all before them with indiſcriminate paſſion, and the more experienced, the better; for Ireland, though open, affords many excellent poſitions, and conſidering the number which the ſquare of a few miles afford, it becomes more neceſſary that the commander ſhould underſtand the *coup d'œuil*, than the changes of feathers and coats and ſuch details as form the *martinet*. The commander of the forces ſhould have a lieutenant-general under him, in each province; Ireland being at preſent in military diſtricts, and the troops changing quarters very often, muſt prevent the army from being properly brigaded. The grand army at Athlone, at leaſt, ought to be brigaded, ſo as that the generals and troops might know each other.

Our

Our next conſideration is, the magazines for proviſions, the commiſariat department and hoſpitals.

I believe, for ſtrict honeſty, activity and talents, the commiſariat department will never be in better hands than while under the preſent commiſſary-general.* But he, or whoever ſucceeds him, muſt have ſuch allowance as will enable him to provide amply, and the enormous and ſhameful quantity of baggage with which our regiments are encumbered, as well as the ridiculous allowance of horſes to officers ſhould be reduced.

If there is time, the cattle in the country where the enemy lands, ſhould be driven in, and (the inhabitants being paid) all corn and forage ought to be deſtroyed, and the country laid waſte; ſuch is the *malheur de la guerre.* I am not for having immenſe ſtores of proviſion on hand; there are means in Ireland of feeding an army as well as in other countries. But a certain quantity of fuel,† flour, potatoes, corn and forage

* Colonel Hanfield.

† Ireland is more deficient in fuel than almoſt any country in Europe.

rage, ſhould be provided immediately, and diſtributed in the magazines.*

I therefore *repeat* that I fear we are deficient in precautions for the *ſubſiſtence* of the army, and particularly fuel in caſe of invaſion: Several thouſand pairs of ſhoes ſhould be alſo in ſtore.

It is ſaid that an army of 20,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, conſume in four weeks, the produce of 4000 acres of productive land. In ſuch caſes there is always waſte. I would have four months proviſions in the magazines, which I would, as I have diſtributed the army, place in five points, and in the ſame points, hoſpitals.†

One in Dublin,
One at Newry,
One at Athlone,
One at Clonmell,

One

* Salt, which is an article ſo neceſſary, is not always to be had in Ireland, for large numbers; its correction of animal putreſcency is ſuch, that the health as well as the palate, requires it with food. The drummers of every company might carry a certain quantity of ſalt, in caſe of emergency.

† There might alſo be an hoſpital and a magazine at New Geneva. On the one hand it is abſolutely neceſſary to provide for the ſuſtenance of an army,—on the other, immenſe ſtores are attended with great loſs; I therefore mention four months proviſion as a medium.

One at Cork,
With leſſer ones near,
One at Limerick,
One at Derry,
One at Galway, *
One at Enniſkillen,
One at Belfaſt.

Gun-boats ſhould be provided on the Shannon, and on the different lakes. I take for granted, that light carts, cannon, howitzers, artillery horſes, pontoons, intrenching tools, camp equipage, blankets, and military ſtores of all ſorts; ammunition, ſhot, &c. have been provided, and are now ready

My next propoſal, is a line of telegraphs—*much* will depend on this—as in caſe of a landing, quick information is of the utmoſt importance, as alſo to be able to communicate what force lands, that the government may be able to diſtinguiſh the real attack from the feints. The line of

telegraphs

* Theſe might be thought too near the probable points of attack, but they are only propoſed as *ſmall* magazines for immediate uſe,

telegraphs would not coſt much, but in theſe caſes expence muſt not be conſidered.

I propoſe one from Dublin, to Cork, Kinſale and Bantry, by Naas, Kilkenny, Clonmell and Fermoy. One from Dublin to Athlone, Limerick and Galway. One from Dublin to Armagh and Belfaſt. One from Dublin to Derry, and a croſs one from Cork to Limerick, Athlone and Strabane.

I ſhall now deſcribe what I conceive, is the advantage of this ſyſtem. As it is impoſſible to know the point where the enemy will land, and as every thing depends on their being quickly defeated, it becomes deſirable to have the forces ſo ſtationed and ſo able to appuyer each other, that an army of 30,000 men may be oppoſite the enemy (let him land where he will) in *four* days from the moment he *anchors*, and without much fatigue. This, I ſay, can be accompliſhed, for according to this method, you have your grand army in the centre of the kingdom, and the line of telegraphs enable you to act with certainty. If the enemy land at Galway, the force there, falls back a little, and are joined by the grand army, the reſerve, the force at Limerick and Clonmell. If unfortunately defeated,

the

the armies of the North and South are collected, and by forced marches gain the enemy's flank, as he marches towards the capital.

If he lands at Bantry or Cork, the army in thoſe parts collect, take a poſition, and wait four days the arrival of the Grand Army from Athlone, and the Reſerve from Dublin.

If he lands in the North Eaſt or North Weſt, the troops in thoſe parts in like manner collect; by advantage of the telegraphs no time is loſt, the army from Athlone and from Dublin, march and meet them in four days, and though Bonaparte on landing in Egypt, puſhed his advance guard commanded by Deſaix, the very day after taking Alexandria, to Demenhoor, 14 leagues up the country, yet it was but miſerable Turks they had to combat. They would not probably advance ſo far in Ireland as 42 miles the day after landing; and the ſtores of a great army, allowing for the tides, &c. could not be landed under three days, ſo that they could make no progreſs into the country, before they would, under the plan propoſed, meet a formidable army, and they might be defeated

before any riſing of the people could ſerve them.*

Laſtly, if they landed near Dublin, the garriſon and Reſerve conſiſt of 19,000 men, the Grand Army comes by the canal from Athlone, and with detachments from County of Wicklow and the North, make your fighting army amount to 40,000 men in four days, excluſive of the Dublin Yeomanry, which could act with the light troops.

In ſhort, under every conſideration, I am perſuaded ſuch a diſtribution of our force is adviſeable; it would be abſurd and detrimental to have them in larger bodies, while expecting a landing, and worſe to have them in ſmaller. Poſſibly this diſpoſition may not be approved of; I offer it with deference, and ſhall not diſpute the point with better informed officers; though the obſervation

* Thoſe who think an invaſion of Ireland, (only three days ſail from Breſt) almoſt impoſſible, on the reliance of our having a ſuperior fleet, would do well to conſider, that Bonaparte carried near 50,000 men (having 300 ſail of tranſports) from France to Egypt, a very long voyage, and though we had a ſuperior fleet in the Mediterranean, and though it had orders to watch him. So much for *poſſibility* where winds and ſalt water interfere.

obſervation of the King of Pruſſia is certainly applicable to many, viz. " un mulet qui auroit " fait dix campagnes, n'en ſeroit pas meilleur tac- " ticien ; et il faut avouer que beaucoup de vieux " officiers ne valent pas mieux que ce mulet. Sui- " vre la rotine—s'occuper de ſa parure, & de ſon " couver—manger quand on mange, boire quand " on peut *l'avoir ;* ſe battre quand tout le monde " ſe bat ; *vaila* ce qui pour le grand nombre s'ap- " pelle avoir fait campagnes, et etre blanchi " ſous le harnois. De la vient ce nombre de " millitaires rouillés dans la médiocrité ; & qui " ne connoiſſent ni les cauſes de leurs triomphes, " ou de leur défaits."

I mention this, to prove from the firſt authority, that every old officer is not a good officer.

I am aware that this ſyſtem of defence may be objected to, (as every ſyſtem of defence may be in ſomething or other) on the principle of the French landing two armies of 20,000 men each, one perhaps in Galway-Bay, and the other at Bantry; as alſo a diverſion in the north or north-weſt, by which means it may be ſaid they would hold the Athlone grand army, or that in the ſouth in check. But I anſwer, if the French

do divide their force: under the advantage of quick information by the telegraph, when the government know (which they can in ſix hours) that the French have landed the above force on thoſe two, or any other points; under the diſtribution, I recommend, they can have in three days, 20,000 to oppoſe the French army at Galway, and the ſame number to oppoſe their 20,000 in the ſouth, and can hold their northern diverſion in check. If, however, it is ſuppoſed that the French can ever land 40,000 men, I imagine they would not divide them: and it muſt be confeſſed that if ſuch a force could land in the preſent ſtate of the country, the conqueſt would be nearly certain.

In caſe of defeat, it would be the duty of the General to retire on one of the points I have before deſcribed—fortify himſelf as well as he could, and collect ſuch of the inhabitants as remained in his intereſt; England would probably reinforce, and then ſhe becomes the attacking army, and a ſecond campaign is the conſequence; what might be the iſſue of that, no man can foretell, the utmoſt is conjecture. But, I believe, if the firſt campaign was diſaſtrous, a ſecond could

not

not recover this country to England. I have mentioned that at all events property ſhould be armed in this country to prevent plunder. Unfortunately, in Ireland there is little or no affection between the lower, and the middle and upper orders; a variety of cauſes, which I think, are obvious, have occaſioned ſuch an animoſity, as would be dangerous if there was nothing elſe. I have no faith whatever in the ridiculous ideas of ſome, (certainly propagated to keep up diſtraction and diviſion) that the catholics look as catholics to the excluſive eſtabliſhment of their religion, or to recover forfeited eſtates; thoſe catholics who have made fortunes have purchaſed as much of theſe lands as proteſtants, and are therefore intereſted in keeping the property as it is. When landed property is diſturbed in any country, by revolution, the leaders are not ſuch fools as to give eſtates to the mob. If Ireland was unfortunately annexed to France, there would no doubt, be confiſcations enough, but certainly not to the mob; and in reſpect to the eſtabliſhing the Catholic religion in Ireland, I do not believe the people (if they had the power) would ſubmit to any eſtabliſhment whatever. They could not have the country in any ſettled ſtate,

and

and attempt the exclusive establishment of any one religion. But the true point on which people ought to be alarmed, is the excess of temporary anarchy, the plunder of all moveable property, and the outrages of a licentious and furious mob, in the event of a successful invasion from France. The want of civilization, in short, the barbarity of the lower orders in this country, would in such an event, occasion a scene of horror hardly to be conceived, and the interim between the evacuation by the English army of any district, and its complete occupation by the French, would present an anarchy and destruction which few can conceive; and therefore, in every town and in every barony, property should be armed to resist plunder.

If the Government is afraid to trust property with arms, it is allowing the country to be in such a disaffected state, that it would be in reality absurd for them to think they could defend it; and, in that case, as the first law of nature is self-preservation, I have no hesitation in saying that property should arm themselves for the purpose I mention. Whatever may be the sentiments of the

the Government or of ſuch individuals, both are intereſted in property being armed. If it was done with the concurrence of Government ſo much the better, but at all events, I repeat it, *in this country* property ſhould be armed.

If a French army was to land, advance, and gain one victory, the probability is, that the entire of the lower orders would riſe; and though we muſt lament it, we can ſcarcely be ſurpriſed at it; while nothing is done to conciliate their affections, and conſolidate the population of Ireland into its intereſt.* It would be abſurd, indeed, for them to truſt the French; but as men act moſtly from paſſion, and as the poor of this country are ſo ignorant, credulous, and miſerable, and that they really have not any thing to loſe in a ſtruggle, while they think they may gain ſomething, having alſo ſtrong reſentments, and being very barbarous, it is to be feared that in ſuch an event, Ireland would become a frightful ſcene of ſlaughter, plunder and devaſtation.

I am

* Theſe pages were written ſoon after the laſt peace; ſince which, Ireland has certainly been more equitably treated than before it; and the farmers are beginning to ſee that it is their intereſt to defend their country againſt invaders, and their property againſt the mob.

I am perſuaded the mob would commit every poſſible exceſs that can be conceived, and that nothing could ſave the country from general plunder of every thing moveable, from the ſilver ſpoon, to the ox, but property being armed; for this purpoſe, whenever a war breaks out, ſuppoſing the regular forces to be diſtributed as before mentioned, and thoſe perſons that could be truſted, and of an active age, formed into yeomanry corps for each Barony, as alſo mentioned, I ſhould further propoſe, that every man of character who can prove himſelf to be worth 100*l.* in any kind of property, ſhould be armed and formed into ſmall corps without pay, under officers of their own appointment, in every town in the kingdom, merely *for the defence of the town;* in ſuch caſes cattle and the like property might ſuffer, but ſuch town guards would effectually check the attacks of a mob, and in the end would either defeat them, or keep them at bay, till the regular army, whether Engliſh or French came up, and in the worſt circumſtance, they would not fall, without deſtroying thouſands of the anarchiſts.

A town having the inhabitants armed, fighting for their all, and the honor and protection of their families,

families, could make a wonderful reſiſtance, even to a regular army, attacking it without cannon, and I cannot conceive how any mob, only armed with pikes and bludgeons, and a few muſkets could carry a town againſt 200 men, ſupplied with fire-arms, occupying the windows, &c. &c.

In the revolt of 1789, in Flanders—Dalton marched 3000 of his beſt men into Turnhout with four pieces of cannon, the towns' people and patriots (about 700) in number, totally defeated them, from the houſes, without ever going into the ſtreets, and the Auſtrians were forced to retreat, leaving two of their cannon. When men are in ſo deſperate a cauſe, though a mob may ſet fire to ſome houſes, the defence of a town is almoſt certain; for every houſe muſt be carried; and can only be carried with great loſs.

I allow Ireland to be at the preſent moment in a ſtate ſo divided, and ſome ſo diſaffected, that many would be indifferent about arming; to ſuch I ſay, if they do not chuſe to arm and fight againſt an enemy with the government, they ought to

arm for themſelves, to be enabled to defend their property and families againſt the mob.

I ſhall conclude with a ſincere wiſh, that Ireland may not become the ſeat of war, even for one campaign. The inhabitants of theſe countries have little idea of its calamities, under even the moſt humane commanders, and beſt diſciplined armies;—and I muſt alſo expreſs my hope, that England will avail herſelf of every opportunity and endeavour to conciliate this country, and that ſhe may ſee before it is too late, how much it is her intereſt to do ſo; but if unfortunately, Ireland ſhould become the theatre of war, I hope the people of the country will recollect, that whatever ſide they take, war ſhould be carried on with humanity—that torture and murder can never be juſtifiable—that they ſhould forget all religious animoſities—that in particular, thoſe who have property, ſhould unite and endeavour to preſerve as much order, as ſuch circumſtances will admit of.

POST-

# POSTSCRIPT.

The foregoing pages were written ſoon after the laſt peace, in 1802. Some other remarks having occurred ſince the breaking out of the war, they are given in a poſtſcript.

I have before mentioned, that there are not any regular fortifications in Ireland. While England had merely the barbarous natives (not very numerous) to keep in order, fortifications *here* might be deemed unneceſſary; but the great change which has taken place in the population of Ireland, and in the *ſyſtem* of Europe, *now* renders *that proper*, which 25 years ago would have been a ridiculous *expence*. I am aware from good experience, in more countries than one, that what is called the fortification ſyſtem, is in *general* an infamous jobbing expenditure *of* public money. But *job or not*, it is abſolutely neceſſary at preſent in Ireland, looking to its defence againſt invaders and rebels—I am not for an extenſive ſyſtem of fortification, but I would recommend one *compleat* fortreſs or citadel, requiring about 2000 men for its defence, in each province in Ireland, that is, *four*—ſuch as the ſtar fort (as it is called) at

Magdeburg; and on the beſt conſtruction. I alſo adviſe that Howth mountain near Dublin, ſhould be purchaſed; it contains 1200 acres, is a little Gibraltar, and might eaſily be made very ſtrong. I would alſo erect a citadel in the Park, near Dublin, (there was one marked out many years ago) and likewiſe fortify the artillery depot at the Pigeon-Houſe; though I do not think the latter of ſuch importance as the others, it might aſſiſt, from its ſituation, as a *ſmall* fort.

It may be aſked *cui bono* all this, and what a number of men would *fortified Howth* require to* garriſon

* The expence may be objected to; if ſo, conſider the importance of the object, and compare it with the expence of building and fitting even four ſail of the line, which are periſhable. The firſt coſt of four ſail of 74, would be to the nation at leaſt 250,000*l.* I do not know the value of Howth land, but in ſuch caſes the public ought to pay individuals for their property with liberality. It contains 1200 acres; average its value at 2*l.* an acre, which is 2,400*l.* a year, which, at 25 years purchaſe is 60,000 pounds, ſo that the coſt of four ſhips of 74 guns would purchaſe the fee, and leave 200,000*l.* to commence the fortification of a poſt which I am poſitive, would turn out to be of the greateſt advantage, particularly if a proper pier was erected, and which, of courſe, ſhould be fortified like the mole at Gibraltar. This is alſo the proper place to have our great ordnance depot, and to diſpatch the Engliſh mails from.

How much better would it be for the inhabitants of Dublin to pay an annual ſum for ſuch fortifications, than the enormous contributions they pay for the worſt paved, and the dirtieſt ſtreets in Europe? and how much better to expend money on ſuch works, than in building churches which will never be of any uſe,—poſſibly not even ornamental.

garriſon it? I anſwer, the provincial fortifications would all afford *points de ralliement* for the loyal inhabitants and troops of Ireland, and would impede the movements of an enemy, and delay the conqueſt of the country. Fortifications near Dublin are *abſolutely* neceſſary; for if a French army landed, and were able to march on to Dublin, (which they might do long before they entirely conquered the country) what would ten thouſand men in Dublin do without a fortreſs to retire to, in caſe of misfortune, for if their number was too ſmall to fight the French army, they have (now) no alternative but to lay down their arms or retreat into the interior, north or ſouth. The total loſs of Dublin and its vicinity would encourage a general riſing, and probably the natives would deſtroy the Dublin retreating army. But, on the other hand, according to this plan, the garriſon retreating from Dublin would be able to keep Howth, (fortified and proviſioned as it ought to be) and it is open to ſuccour from England. Their numbers would be ſufficient to garriſon it; and, what is a matter of no ſmall importance, here you might, in that caſe, move all the *public records*. If taken at laſt, that is no argument againſt as much precaution and defence

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as poſſible; Dublin itſelf is capable of as good fortification, as I think ſhould ever be given to ſo large a town. Surrounded by the canal, a fleche, and a martello tower, with ſtrong picquets at every avenue of approach, would at leaſt retard an enemy, and certainly render it impregnable to a mob, and at trifling expence. Expence however muſt not be conſidered, when ſo much is at ſtake, and it would not coſt half as much as the *annual* jobs of the country.*

Attempting

* One benefit from the Union certainly is, that what are called *jobs* are in a fair way of being put an end to, in this country; and therefore I ſpeak more of what has been, when I ſay, the *annual jobs*, than of what now exiſts; yet certainly ſome remain. In a former part of the pamphlet, I mentioned, that ſince the Union, many were out of humour; it cannot be denied. I am not however, unfriendly to the principle; yet had I been in parliament, I ſhould have voted againſt it, not becauſe ſome particular friends (however I reſpected their opinion) were againſt it, but becauſe I neither liked the terms, nor the way that meaſure was carried. That it was inevitable is clearly proved in an ingenuous pamphlet by a philoſopher, and therefore I have often thought, when all hopes of defeating it were over, it would have been wiſer for parliament to have made a ſtand on the terms than on the meaſure. Our independence was merely nominal, and though many oppoſed the Union on the pureſt principles, and ſhewed an honeſty above all temptation; more oppoſed it as ſtriking at the root of, and deſtroying thoſe *jobs* I have alluded to—and the harveſt of patronage, which parliamentary oppoſition afforded.

Attempting to make Dublin caſtle a fortification by a *wall*, and pulling down a few houſes, is ridiculous and *expenſive* in the extreme. It is no point for a fortification, nor is there any neceſſity for it; but I wiſh we had Howth fortified, where artillery ſtores, and every thing might be en dépot. I am perſuaded of the utility of fortifying the points I mention; and am alſo certain the French, if in poſſeſſion of this country, would fortify them directly.

The plan of martello towers lately thought of, is (under proper diſtribution) an improvement to the country's defence.—I would be glad to have ſuch a tower in every large town, or rather *near* each town, as an excellent check to the mob, and a comparatively cheap ſyſtem of internal fortification. The erection of ſuch towers on the ſea coaſt, may in certain points be uſeful, but as a general plan all round the

afforded. The defence of theſe realms requires that the ſtrength of the empire ſhould be conſolidated, to enable us to oppoſe our enemies. It is under that view that I have mentioned the *Union*, as it is of importance to remove diſcontent—and I do not ſee why that ſame act ſhould not, like any other, be reviſed and corrected, and ſuch an act of union paſſed as would have the deſired effect.

the coast, would in my opinion, be a bad expenditure of public money. Such towers it is true, are to be found along the Spaniſh, and Italian coaſt, in the Mediteranean; their object is to defend the coaſt againſt pirates, Algerines and rovers, who frequently land, and do miſchief in thoſe countries; but they were not built as an oppoſition to an invading army. Such towers could not, I think, prevent an enemy from landing, covered by men of war, and it is alſo to be feared, that the building of them on the coaſt *generally*, would turn out a mere job, to put money in the *land-holders*, and contracters pockets. But to a certain degree, I approve of them on the coaſt.

Another obſervation worth the attention of government, is, that until the morals of the people are more attended to—whiſkey aboliſhed—and ſome attempt made, to identify the country into one intereſt, by a change of the ſyſtem; it is in vain to expect our natives will be any thing better than ſavages, ever ready to murder, plunder, and go into anarchy. I confeſs, I have a horror, of what I believe would be the conſequence of a French invaſion, in any force; and

I hope

I hope we have a well organiſed ſyſtem, or plan of defence. As to the idea that property is now tolerably armed, and the population *not*, it is a deception; were the French to land in any force, the moment the people dare make pikes, there are *materials*, *Carpenters*, and *Smiths* enough, to arm all Ireland with pikes, in a fortnight*. And it may be worth conſideration what might follow ſuch an armament, having perhaps twenty-five thouſand French troops to direct them. We are late in all our preparations, but as probably no landing will take place before next winter; every exertion ought to be made *now*, leſt the war ſhould laſt.

There ought not to be any brigadier generals, it takes colonels from their regimental duty, is attended with much inconvenience, from the *claſhing* of other colonels. Our ſervice muſt be bad indeed, if the *great* liſt of major generals



* In the ſearches that have been made for arms, this circumſtance does not ſeem to have been conſidered—the taking a gentleman or a ſubſtantial farmer's arms for a neglect of regiſtry, is in fact diſarming property.

would not furniſh officers enough for commands, without interfering with colonels, whoſe ſervices are wanted with their regiments.

The ſyſtem propoſed of a general driving of the country; removing ſtock, &c. in every diſtrict, in caſe of a landing, is utterly impracticable, and is mere nonſenſe. The bill was made for England, and not for Ireland, where very different circumſtances would cauſe different effects. I doubt the poſſibility of executing the order—and I have other weighty objections to it; the people would not bring in their cattle unleſs forced.—The *forcing* would occaſion the utmoſt confuſion. There is no proviſion for feeding the cattle at any of the propoſed depots. It would end in tumult and *general robbery*. I am certain drivers of *truſt* are not to be had; and it appears to me abſurd to loſe time in forming plans that cannot be executed.

The hiſtory of the world demonſtra tes, that in all periods the ſame cauſes have produced nearly

nearly the ſame effects; and we ſhould find another example to prove this, were we a prey to civil war—probably after a horrible ſcene of frightful licentiouſneſs, we ſhould be reduced to abſolute deſpotiſm, either as a province to France —a re-conquered country by England—or *under Iriſh uſurpers.*

The preſent moment therefore requires exertion and unanimity. Ireland torn to pieces with internal diſcord—religious animoſity—and with an uncivilized uneducated population, is the moſt unfit country in Europe for a revolution. I am far from denying that many abuſes exiſt, but I think there ſeems a diſpoſition to correct them; and were it otherwiſe, I would aſk the moſt violent reformer, what hopes could he have from either a French army, or an Iriſh mob? I am ſorry to ſay, there is ſuch a total want of honeſty in our lower orders, that no one but a madman could look for reform through them; and every man muſt allow, that it is far better for Ireland to be connected with England, than

with France.* The diſhoneſty ariſes from want of education, and from the barbarous ſtate they are kept in by the immoderate uſe of whiſkey. They are alſo in every circumſtance the moſt thoughtleſs, improvident, and indiſcreet people exiſting. Miſery is the natural conſequence; much of the latter however is occaſioned by the abſentees. When the principal proprietors of the lands draw all their revenues out of a country, and make no return, it muſt be felt by the people†. This—the ſpirit of party—and our abſurd

* Extremes, and oppoſite cauſes, often produce the ſame effects; and thus great poverty and want of education, tend to make people diſhoneſt, as great riches with avarice, and too much knowledge, likewiſe do. The former being in conſequence of want, and barbarity--the latter, of temptation and luxury; therefore, in very rich and enlightened places as London—and in very poor countries like Ireland, there will be diſhoneſty. The rich countries can only check it by puniſhments; civilization is the firſt cure for the poor countries,—for pilfering is too much extended in them, to be reached by ordinary laws. Therefore the miſerable ſtate of the Iriſh poor, is in ſome degree an excuſe for their faults; like the inhabitants of every other country, they are born honeſt. They are a miſmanaged people; and it is high time that the government ſhould ſeriouſly inquire into their ſituation.

† The vaſt ſums remitted to England, for intereſt of loans and to abſentees, muſt in the end occaſion bankruptcy here, if the ſyſtem of borrowing in England is perſiſted in. One of

abſurd religious diviſions; all operate againſt the proſperity of Ireland, and make its defence againſt the enemy more difficult.

Yet the common people are more intereſted in oppoſing the French, than they at preſent believe, for if once a French army was eſtabliſhed here; they would find what a change it would be to them. The various workmen who now get ſuch enormous wages, would be thrown out of employ, and would ſtarve. Some might, as I have obſerved, plunder where they could; but ultimately the French would be the plunderers, and then the people would experience an *order*, by French ſummary law, which they have no idea of; and which it is ſurpriſing has not been explained to them. Any one who reads the campaigns ~~of Bona~~parte in Italy, will ſee with how little ceremony the people were ſhot; ſometimes juſtly, oftener under the prophanation of the ſacred name of liberty. Entire municipalities alſo *ſhot*, if the requiſition (whatever it might be) was not complied with—are we to ſuppoſe the French would

of the great errors of England to Ireland, is the proportion of taxation required from us—this country is poſitively *too poor*, to ſupport ſuch drains.

would act differently here? if any think they would, I can only pity their folly.

The military in Ireland, are at present in a far better state of discipline, than they were a few years ago; but I am certain the orders of sir Ralph Abercrombie, dated 26th February, 1798, laid the foundation of it. Though those orders were shamefully ridiculed, they did honor to the general who gave them. A man who being just and honorable himself, and a true soldier, held military licentiousness in abhorrence, and did his duty in defiance of party.* I think it would be an advantage if the *point d'honneur*, was more attended to in our regiments, and the punishments less severe; 700 lashes injures a man's health, and is useless. A court-martial ought to be restricted to 400; if that punishment will not reform—4000 will not. The barbarity, and in fact illegal proceeding of punishing a soldier *twice for the same crime*—" that is, when he is sentenced a greater

* In many instances, the troops have been billeted contrary to law; in Ireland private houses are by law exempt, until every public house is filled; but wherever complaints have been made to government, they have been attended to; there are some other abuses in this point, which ought to be corrected.

a greater number of laſhes than he can bear at once; giving him the puniſhment at two or three times," is ſhocking to humanity, and ought not to be allowed; I believe it is now ſeldom done. The French never flog their ſoldiers, and their diſcipline goes on juſt as well. I am an advocate for the ſtricteſt diſcipline, and muſt admit (conſidering that moſt of our private ſoldiers are enliſted from the loweſt claſſes of ſociety) it would be impoſſible to rule them without corporal puniſhment; ſtill however I wiſh to give them a certain pride, and *eſprit de corps*. I am told that in many inſtances, they have been *ordered*, or permitted to act as executioners for the civil power. I hope I have been miſinformed; and that in no caſe the king's troops have ever been ſo degraded. For military executions, the provoſt is the proper officer; and though the troops are to aſſiſt the civil power to keep the peace, it is the ſheriff's duty to find a perſon to execute the law; and I further think, a ſoldier would be juſtifiable in refuſing this, for he enliſted to ſerve his majeſty, in the honorable character of a ſoldier, and not as an executioner.

I have

I have recommended gun-boats, for particular rivers and lakes. I do not ſee the benefit of them along the coaſt; they add to our expences, and certainly cannot prevent an invaſion; of courſe are uſeleſs.* I look on the coaſt or ſea fencibles, in the ſame light. There is no doubt of the zeal of the naval officers ſent on this ſervice, but can any man ſuppoſe that the fiſhermen of our coaſts, and a few boats, will tend to any uſe equal to their expence.

I have not mentioned any thing of the ordinary regimental duty, as every commanding officer muſt be preſumed to underſtand ſuch detail. Our ſoldiers are well paid, and well clothed, and the muſter rolls now account fairly for every man; it is not in regimental matters that our ſyſtem is moſt defective: but I think the private ſoldier carries too much when in marching order.

It has been well obſerved, that *marching*—*fighting*—and *ſtarving*, are at times the ſoldier's lot, and the army that excels in theſe three points, will probably (if decently commanded) ultimately ſucceed.

* Expence ſhould not be conſidered, where really uſeful—otherwiſe I am for the utmoſt œconomy.

ſucceed. It is impoſſible for our troops to make rapid movements, ſo heavily loaded as they are at preſent.

Our enemy has recourſe to ſtrong military meaſures, for the perfection of his army; it is a folly to ſuppoſe that we can meet him on equal terms, without having alſo recourſe to meaſures different from our uſual practice. Frederick the Great obſerved, that if his enemy brought eighteen pounders into the field, he immediately put twenty-fours into his ordinary train.

When the military power of France is fairly conſidered, an impartial perſon muſt confeſs that, inſtead of *locking* up all our men from the regular army; inſtead of ſpending vaſt ſums, endeavouring to raiſe new regiments, to be commanded by country gentlemen; (which is certainly a hardſhip on the line, as long as there is one of its colonels unemployed, or on half pay; and after that, is diſappointing the juſt expectations of all the lieutenant colonels in the army;) inſtead of expecting to get a regiment fit for ſervice, without *any foundation;* it would be wiſe to act differently. If new regiments are to be raiſed, I would

begin, by drafting a ſufficient number of non-commiſſioned officers from the old regiments,* (whoſe places could be inſtantly filled up) *and which would be a promotion and encouragement to old ſoldiers.* With ſuch a foundation, and a good adjutant, a regiment might be ſoon formed;† and I humbly conceive they ſhould all be given to officers of the line. The idea, that country gentlemen can get men, and that officers cannot, is deluſive; it is the *guineas*, and the guineas only, that get them. There are no feudal attachments in England or Ireland; in Scotland there may be ſome. But the grand point appears to me to be this:—If we remain continually on the defenſive, the expence is ruinous, and no proſpect of its end. The French have not the ſame

* I know many object to old non-commiſſioned officers, and think they inſtruct the young ſoldiers, in tricks and roguery. But they are notwithſtanding, neceſſary.

† To prove the advantage of having an experienced lieutenant colonel, what attention will do, and how uſeful it is to have at leaſt ſome officers, and non-commiſſioned officers, as a foundation for a new levy. I muſt mention a battalion now in Dublin, of 1000 men, attached to the 53d regiment—I am aſſured they have not been *four months raiſed*, they are as ſteady as any old corps, and have as different an air from the uſual new levies, as can be conceived, and I hear, their behaviour is as good as their appearance.

ſame expences; they quarter their army on other countries; they have not ſo great a debt as England; and the wear and tare of one of our ſhips of the line in ſix months, coſts more than that of a quarter of their gun-boats. If the war is to go on, it ſhould be carried on with vigour. I am not for the Quixotic folly of a ſerious attack on France, or Flanders; but as we have a naval ſuperiority, why not embark troops and try to reſcue Hanover?—why not annoy the enemy by *coaſt expeditions*, wherever there is reaſonable probability of ſucceſs? why not aſſiſt Holland?*—



* Attempting to force a government on another country, is uſeleſs as well as unjuſt. The propriety therefore of ſending any force to Holland, muſt depend on the *real diſpoſition* of the Dutch. It is certain that at preſent Holland can only be conſidered as a province to France; and yet I doubt if there is as much diſcontent there as we hear. I have been often in Holland and Flanders, and I know both thoſe countries were loſt, by the perſevering abuſes of their former governments. The memoirs lately publiſhed by Segur, prove this very clearly. I can however, take on me to aſſert, that any idea of reſtoring the Stadtholder would be folly in the extreme, and would defeat every chance of reſcuing Holland from France.

There is another very important expedition, in which a diſpoſable force might be employed—but as I think it muſt have occurred to his majeſty's miniſters, and as ſecrecy is neceſſary

why not alſo avail ourſelves of another ſort of defence againſt invaſion, namely, having a large diſpoſable force on the coaſt, which ſhall threaten to invade La Vendee, the moment the French invade Ireland? or be ready to follow them here. But this cannot be done unleſs our regiments of the line are compleat.

I am as much againſt unconſtitutional meaſures as any man; but the ſame neceſſity which in the Miniſter's opinion requires the ſuſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus act, will juſtify other meaſures, which in other times would not be thought of. I am convinced that a peace, followed as it might be (if properly managed) by a new balance of power in Europe, would be of the greateſt advantage to theſe countries;—to thoſe who ſay it is impoſſible, I anſwer ſo it is, if you do not try; but if we are to continue at war, and without allies, we muſt go out of the uſual practice to recruit our army; I therefore boldly ſay there is but one way to do it. The meaſure may be ſtrong,

ceſſary, if thought right to attempt it, I ſhall give no further hint; but if England does not adopt this conduct, ſhe has another, and I think, no other left, viz. to ſeize all the foreign colonies of France, and to act on her naval ſuperiority: as for inſtance, let her conduct ſay to France;—You rule the continent; we will rule the ſeas.—You oppoſe our continental connections; you ſhall not have any trade or interference with the ſeas.—We confine ourſelves chiefly to a defenſive land and offenſive ſea war; and we will deſtroy your trade and your navy, national and mercantile.

ſtrong, but it is abſolutely neceſſary. Allow as many of the Engliſh, Iriſh and Scotch militia as chuſe it, to enliſt in the line for general ſervice, and till ſix months after a peace, (except the Weſt Indies) give them five guineas bounty, (which is enough); the meaſure is voluntary on their part, ſo no breach of faith. Imperial neceſſity would then require either a repeal of the Volunteer act, or a reduction of their numbers, and whether it is called a requiſition or not, fill up the militia by a new ballot, to be inſtantly made, and take none but proper men. The children that have been enliſted in moſt of the Engliſh reſerve corps, may be good ſoldiers five years hence; but it would be *cheaper*, in fact, to give thirty guineas bounty for a man fit for ſervice now, than ten and fifteen, for boys of nearly that age. The old men and cripples are a ſhameful burleſque on the army.

Our military force ought to be placed on the moſt reſpectable footing; the nation we have to contend with requires it. By what other method can we oppoſe a military government, commanding a military population of thirty-ſix millions. The Volunteer ſyſtem will not do; it will be found deficient if ever ſeriouſly tried. I confeſs (at the hazard of being charged with partiality) I have no reliance on ſuch a body. Their diſpoſition I call not in queſtion, but the want of ſubordination and diſcipline muſt render them

them uſeleſs, except as a police, which England does not want*. We cannot have a proper army till this ſyſtem is altered. I cannot ſee why theſe Volunteers—reſerves or even the militia (whoſe ſervices are all limited) ſhould have ſuch advantages over the troops of the line. There can be no queſtion but the armed peaſantry (in England) would be preferable to theſe privileged Volunteers; for as a very great and wiſe man (Mr. Fox) ſaid lately in Parliament, it would give us two millions of men, all fit for *irregular* war, in place of four hundred thouſand Volunteers, who in all probability will never be fit for regular war. Next to troops of the line, militia is certainly beſt; the more we have of the former the better, if we are to be a military country. But even theſe will not do, if they are not well commanded, and if the utmoſt attention to their diſcipline and good order is not exacted. To ſhew how ſuch matters are attended to in other countries, I ſhall inſert in a note a letter on that ſubject which deſerves to

* I recollect in the time of the Iriſh Volunteers 1782: after they had the thanks of their country, &c. and were the ſubjects of approbation in every company, a reſpectable general officer ſpeaking of them; obſerved, "They certainly are a fine body, and are well diſpoſed, &c. but my objection to them is that they are not under military diſcipline, and I would not truſt an army even of Biſhops, without a Mutiny Bill to keep them in order."

to be recorded, and of which I happen to have a copy. It was written by Frederick the Great (in times of profound peace) to one of his generals, viz. Tauinzin: *

The

* This letter was written in 1784, by the King of Pruſſia, to the Commander in Chief of his Sileſian army.

My dear General de Tauinzin,

When I was preſent in Sileſia, I mentioned to you and now I repeat it in writing, that my army in Sileſia never was in ſo bad a condition as at preſent. Were I to make Generals of ſhoemakers and taylors, the regiments could not well be worſe. The regiment of Thadden is not even equal to the moſt inſignificant battalion of militia of Pruſſia, neither are Rothkirk or Schwariz good for much. Zurimba is in ſuch confuſion, that as ſoon as the autumn manœuvres of this year are ended, I propoſe to ſend an officer of my own regiment to put them to rights again. Erlach's men are corrupted by dealing in contraband goods, ſo as to have no more a ſoldier-like look. Keller looks like a troop of raw peaſants. Hagen has a wretched commander, and your own regiment likewiſe is but indifferent. I can only be ſatisfied with Count Anhalt, Wendeſſen, and Margrave Henry. I will now deſcribe the manœuvres. Schwariz made near Niefs the unpardonable fault not to be in force ſufficient on the heights. Had it been ſerious, the battle had been loſt. Erlaſh, near Breſlaw, marched with its divifions through the defilé in perplexed confuſion; and had the engagement been ſerious, the enemy's cavalry had cut the infantry to pieces, and the battle had been loſt. I am not inclined to loſe battles by the ſlothfulneſs of my Generals; therefore I will, that next year if I am alive, you do march the army into camp between Breſlaw and Ohlaw,

The immenſe acquiſition of territory, acquired by France in the laſt ten years, and the circumſtance of its being no longer conſidered a diſgrace to be a merchant or trader, there is a *momentous* conſideration; for was monarchy even reſtored, I do not ſee that it would leſſen the dominions or the reſources of that country. The balance of Europe is at preſent deſtroyed; and it is only by ſome *great effort* that it can be reſtored.—When I have heard people exult at any report of a counter-revolution,—of Bonaparte's power being at an end,—or the like, I confeſs I ſmile at the hollow comfort which the news appears to give them, and am ſurpriſed how rational perſons can ſo impoſe on their underſtanding*.

Whether

Ohlaw, near Marſchwiz; but that before you arrive in camp, you manœuvre with the inexperienced Generals, and inſtruct them in their duty. The regiments of Arnin and of Koeniz, repreſents the enemy; and whoever then does not do his duty ſhall be tried by a Court Martial; for I would blame every power to continue in their ſervice, men, that care ſo little about their profeſſion; therefore nobody can blame me. Erlach remains under arreſt four weeks longer.

You are to communicate copies of this my will and pleaſure to the whole army under your inſpection.

I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

F.

* The French Revolution affords an awful leſſon on the inſtability of human affairs, the downfall of great, and the extraordinary

Whether France was a Monarchy, as before the revolution;—a Republic, as in 1790;—a ſcene of horror and deſpotiſm as under Robeſpierre;—or when we thought there was a chance of civil commotions, turning to our advantage, as the Lyons and La Vendee wars, or during the various ſtruggles for power ſince the revolution; or when governed by a Directory; or as now, a military government under Bonaparte, I have ſeen no diminution of either the ſpirit of aggrandiſement, or hatred to England: under all the various agitations of France, ſhe has ſtill retained her enmity to England. It is therefore high time that we ſhould follow the Dutch maxim, *Concordia*. England, (though her debt is heavy) is ſtill a great country. Money and men are the ſinews of war. There are means to draw forth both, if properly applied, and Eng-



extraordinary riſe of obſcure individuals. Every one muſt allow that Bonaparte is a wonderful man, as well as a great general; as to his private character, it is no concern of ours; and as to his ambition, that is a paſſion from which ſcarcely any of the miniſters of great ſtates can claim exemption. There is neither ſenſe or good manners in the perſonal abuſe with which the Britiſh Newſpapers are filled againſt him, and I really think it unworthy of the Nation.

land might prove that ſhe is able to contend ſingle-handed with France. Ireland is a poor country, and it is a miſtake to ſuppoſe ſhe can contribute much money. She is now taxed almoſt as much as ſhe can bear—an increaſe will increaſe diſcontent. England ſhould give money, Ireland and Scotland men. An Income Tax for Ireland was lately ſpoken of; but I am glad to hear it is given up. I declare I do not know any meaſure more likely to add to diſcontent, or more impolitic than ſuch a tax would be at this time.

It may appear preſumptuous in a military writer to meddle with finance; but I ſay, if England continues at war, ſhe muſt look to her finances. She has one great reſource, which ſhe will probably have recourſe to before very long. What I mean would neither injure the country, or any individual in it, and, if I am not miſinformed, was in the contemplation of a former miniſter.

A diſcontented country cannot be conciliated in a moment. For the preſent Ireland muſt be

be kept by a ſuperior military force; but it is the intereſt of England to govern us well, and ſhe ſhould not loſe a moment in endeavouring to bring about ſo deſirable a thing, as the conſolidation and cordial union of the two countries. Both are deeply intereſted in it; for the conqueſt of Ireland by France would reduce it to ſlavery, and would infallibly lead to the deſtruction of England. I diſlike all ſort of deception; it is notorious, that our greateſt weakneſs ariſes from the diſcontent of the country; and, though truth may be unpleaſant, I am poſitive it is in moſt caſes (if not always) better to declare it.

Quid melius aut majus Reipublicæ Facere poſſumus quam ſi populos Erudimus atque docemus.

I have heard people ſay Ireland could not ſtand by herſelf: in her preſent ſtate it is true; but as a political poſſibility it is falſe. Smaller countries have ruled themſelves. I only mention this, to ſhew the imprudence of thoſe, who fancy they could, either by rebellion, or by French aſſiſtance, make Ireland a free independent ſtate. We are neither united, nor ſufficiently civilized, to ſee ſuch an event for many years,

and in the interim England will probably ſee her true intereſt, and have a true union with Ireland. Every man muſt wiſh for this, becauſe it will require the energy of both countries to effectually oppoſe France. But, ſo unfit is Ireland for revolution, or ſtanding by herſelf, that, if to-morrow both France and England were to withdraw, and ſay, Ireland ſtand alone, we ſhall not interfere with you—the conſequence would be, a ſcene of ſlaughter, of wild and ferocious diſpute for power, and ultimate anarchy, deſtruction, and diſgrace.*

In

* Not many years ago a certain man, then high in office, declared, that all our upper orders were corrupt, and the lower tame. I believe he lived to ſee he was in part miſtaken, as he was in many of his opinions. The declaration gave great offence at the time. If it is ſaid that the Union proves the aſſertion; I anſwer, it alſo furniſhes ſome proof of the contrary. General abuſe is equally fooliſh and unjuſt; it is equally abſurd to diſguiſe truth when its expoſition can be uſeful. I love my country, and would rather keep its faults ſecret than uſeleſsly expoſe them: it is therefore as admonition, and not in ill humour, that I confeſs that, among the other difficulties of our ſituation, ſeveral of the upper orders are very corrupt; the middle are violent, many to an acrimonious degree; the lower are very ſagacious, but the majority of them are unfortunately, as deſcribed by Mr. Toue's

In a moment of convulſion and agitation, calm inquiry can hardly be expected; but to thoſe who can command their tempers to ſuch purſuit; it muſt be obvious—that in this enlightened age, as it is called, we ſtill ſee as extraordinary and violent prejudices and follies, as at almoſt any period (though poſſibly leſs ſuperſtition, than ſome centuries ago). In fact true philoſophy has made but little progreſs. Bright ages have been ſucceeded by groſs ſuperſtition and darkneſs, and the latter again by more happy times, and ſo the world goes round. I allow the greater part of the human ſpecies are ſtill in clouds of ignorance, and great comparative miſery. I wiſh I could ſee that golden age which would better their ſituation; but it ſeems otherwiſe ordained by Providence, for after many thouſand years, and many revolutions, the world ſeems to go on as uſual; and the ſame gradations exiſt in ſociety that always exiſted; and it always muſt be ſo. A very little reflection will ſhew the truth of Condorcet's remark, "There exiſts a neceſſary cauſe of inequality,

Tone's Memoir, in that ſemi-barbarous ſtate, which fits them for war, and makes them ready to join in any thing which promiſes change or plunder.

equality, of dependence, and even of miſery, which menaces without ceaſing, the moſt numerous claſs of our ſocieties. (*progrés de l'eſprit*)." I beg alſo to refer the reader to the very able work of Malthus on population, if he ſtill has any doubt that a certain degree of miſery among the lower claſſes of ſociety, is alſo irremediable; and it would be eaſy to prove (indeed Malthus does it) that if a labourer's wages was made even five ſhillings a day, it would be a falſe concluſion to ſuppoſe his ſituation would be much better— its effect would be *to proportionably* advance the price of every thing, and thus leave him exactly where he was.* Therefore a certain poverty is no

* Though the above is perfectly true, yet wages may alſo be too low. Such is the caſe in Ireland, in reſpect to labourers; their wages bears no proportion to the price of the neceſſaries of life. The cheapneſs of potatoes certainly enables them to *exiſt*; but comforts, or even decent cloathing for their families, are impoſſible; add to this the whiſkey temptation. On the other hand, artificers through *combination*, exact ſuch high wages, as muſt ſtop all improvement.

If only a *part of the people* have high wages, (as in this caſe) it will not have the immediate effect of advancing all articles, as above ſtated; but in a little time it muſt come to a level, either by a proportional advance on the price

no argument that the government is bad. My object is to ſhew how much better England's political ſituation is, than that of her neighbours; and therefore how intereſted all men are in her defence.

We have ſeen Europe convulſed for ſixteen years; every ſort of private misfortune, much public calamity and miſery, all over the world; a nobility and a clergy that ſeemed firmly eſtabliſhed, entirely overturned—and I aſk has any country in Europe, one atom more liberty than in

price of food—or by our not being able to afford the COMBINATION DEMANDS.

However the lot and comforts of the poor, may certainly be *ameliorated*; though never entirely changed.

* We have alſo ſeen that men of the beſt characters, and higheſt talents; ſuch as the Briſotines, have been murdered in a civilized country: and popular fury ſo miſdirected, as to approve at the ſame time, of the moſt abſurd and unjuſt acts. After all this experience, ſhould we not uſe every effort to keep off the calamity of revolution. It is alſo the duty of thoſe in power to prevent ſuch misfortunes, by a timely correction of abuſe. But all men high and low, are unfortunately more governed by paſſion, than by reaſon. When the power of the Jeſuits was on *the decline*, it was propoſed in

in 1788. In fact the cauſe of liberty has rather gone down.* With all this, it is a conſolation that the world can never revert again to total darkneſs or barbariſm. Three diſcoveries are a ſhield againſt that: 1ſt, the art of Printing—2d, the diſcovery of America, and the liberty on which its government is founded—and 3dly, gunpowder and artillery, which gives the civilized nations, power over millions of Goths, or barbarians, &c.

If Ireland was to fall to France, England, all powerful as ſhe is, would ſoon follow: and if England was ſucceſsfully invaded, Ireland would fall. The two countries muſt therefore, cordially unite: the laſt ſixteen years afford an awful leſſon to government, and to the people.

Let any perſon conſider the following undeniable facts:

In

* in the College at Rome, to make ſome conceſſions, &c. &c. No, ſaid father Ricci their general, ſtriking the table with violence, *tuni ó niente*. I am ſorry to ſay, many of the higher claſſes, ſeem to have adopted this maxim; they ſhould recollect the fate of the Jeſuits.

In England any member of parliament, may ſpeak his ſentiments without fear, and though he cannot command a queſtion againſt the miniſter, yet he can expoſe him if he deſerves it.

The loweſt peaſant may riſe if he has merit, to the higheſt ſituation in the ſtate.

On the whole, a man's life, liberty, and property, is better protected in England, than any where elſe.

The great cannot oppreſs, or ill treat the lower orders.

If the higheſt in rank, or richeſt man in the community is diſgraced by crime, he is baniſhed ſociety.

Artificers and manufacturers have the utmoſt encouragement; and in no country have the poor ſuch univerſal encouragement or work.

Though bad miniſters have at times invaded our rights, ſuch proceedings have been only temporary.

Public opinion is a barometer, by which miniſters and individuals, muſt regulate their conduct more in England, than in any other country.

The immenſe trade and riches of England, which give bread to ſo many thouſands, may create foreign envy, but the overturn of it would be deſtruction to the poor, as well as to the rich. Violent men in moments of diſappointment, may not like to allow this; yet notwithſtanding the rapid ſtrides of corruption, it is all *fact*; and on cool reflection it cannot be denied. What country in Europe, can make the ſame boaſt? Therefore I am warranted in declaring, the Engliſh Conſtitution with all its faults, is well worth fighting for.

Having in ſome degree departed from my ſubject (the defence of Ireland), and mentioned ſome political matters reſpecting England and Ireland, but which in truth are not ſo unconnected with the country's defence as they might at firſt appear. I ſhall venture to mention another ſubject, viz. Religion. I am certain Ireland will never be contented or happy, while any part of the Popery laws remain. The continuance of laws that are, in fact, uſeleſs, can only be occaſioned by intolerable bigotry and folly. What remains to be granted, is not worth refuſing: Ireland affords proof that perſecution will never

alter

alter opinion; and though it may be ſaid, the Catholic has got ſo much, that he would, in fact, ſcarcely benefit by the total emancipation; yet men will never be content while they are in any degree marked on account of their religion; and ſuch a ſpirit is praiſe-worthy. * When Proteſtants complain of Catholic bigotry, they ſhould recollect their own. It is high time for men to be liberal and charitable to each other on this point; and if we conſider that the great majority of the Iriſh are Catholics, and pay to another church, from which they derive no benefit, it would ſurely be reaſonable to claſs and pay their clergy. ——We have all reaſon to regret theſe ſame Popery laws. Much injuſtice has been done by them to Proteſtant individuals, as well as to Catholics. They have been conſtrued at pleaſure: at one time robbing the Catholic; then holding out a reward for profligacy; at another ſeducing

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* I am convinced, that every inſinuation againſt the loyalty of the Catholics on account of religion, is unfounded, the majority of the nation being Catholics—of courſe, the majority of thoſe concerned in any diſturbance muſt be Catholics. It is a miſtake to ſuppoſe that their religion has any thing to ſay to it. But conſidering how greatly they have been calumniated, it is not ſurpriſing, that very amiable and worthy men (ſtrangers to Ireland) have been deceived on this point.

the Proteſtant to purchaſe Catholic property under them; and then, by ſome quibble, robbing the Proteſtant. But the private injuſtice and calamity, occaſioned by theſe laws, has been trifling indeed, compared with their direful public effects.

That France will invade Ireland whenever ſhe can, there ſeems no doubt. How far ſhe may be able to effect it at preſent, is another queſtion. Poſſibly ſhe is acting againſt our finances, and endeavouring to wear us out with expence. At all events ſhe is not to be truſted, and we ſhould be well prepared.

It may appear arrogant in any individual, to offer his ſentiments on this ſubject; and it may be aſked, how far his experience can juſtify his doing ſo. If there is any thing worth notice in theſe pages, there is no occaſion for ſuch inquiry, if otherwiſe, they are at leaſt harmleſs. In this martial age however, when *ſo many are in arms and* think themſelves judges of military affairs, the ſelf vanity of individuals may cauſe them to eſtimate *themſelves* too highly, and others too little; and therefore whatever are their opinions, it may be uſeful to obſerve to ſuch, that there

are many officers who can put a battalion through the eighteen manœuvres, and who underſtand all the minutia of regimental duty, but who have no knowledge of the art of war, or of the movements, combination, or management of an army. And on the other hand, I know ſome general officers, who have highly diſtinguiſhed themſelves, and who have ſtudied their profeſſion, who could not put a regiment through the eighteen manœuvres, if the ſalvation of the ſtate depended on it; a knowledge however of this detail, is uſeful; yet it muſt not be ſuppoſed, that the officer who (from repeating the parade leſſon every day) is an excellent drill-adjutant, is alſo a great captain; the knowledge of many (in all ſervices) does not extend much beyond the parade.

Now, as I allow myſelf to be one of the latter deſcription, ſome apology is certainly neceſſary; I therefore repeat, that I offer my ſentiments with all humility.

I have founded my ſyſtem of defence to meet the diſpoſition of the maſs of our population, as well as invaſion. I have deſcribed that diſpoſition

(as I fear it is,) influenced more by a deſire to plunder, than to redreſs real or ſuppoſed grievances. Some allowance muſt be made for a people, the majority of whom are in a ſtate of deplorable miſery, and whoſe morals are ſacrificed to revenue ſo long as whiſkey is encouraged. The want of education, and the benefit of it, is ſtrongly illuſtrated by a compariſon of the Scotch and the Iriſh peaſantry. The Iriſh are certainly a good-natured people; the raw material is excellent, but as yet it has not been aſſiſted, or uſed to profit.

I am aſtoniſhed that the abſentees are not obliged by Government to repair to Ireland at ſuch a time, to help in its defence, and to give that aſſiſtance, which is naturally expected from rank and education in ſuch critical times.

The riſing of the 23d of July, though inſignificant, proves the diſpoſition of our lower orders, and the folly of ſuppoſing it would be poſſible to keep them within bounds; and the murder of Lord Kilwarden ſhews what might be expected from a mob revolution. His dying words will be for ever recorded; they hold out a fine example of greatneſs of mind to his countrymen, and prove that his moderation and love

of

of juſtice was unalterable in the moſt trying moment; when his child was torn from him, and while ſuffering under the pain of barbarous wounds, which he knew he could only ſurvive a few moments,—*Let none ſuffer*, ſaid he, *but by law, after a fair trial.*

I hope I ſhall not be accuſed of preſumption for paſſing any criticiſm on the two pamphlets I have mentioned. I do not ſay I am right, and they wrong; I only ſubmit a difference of opinion, and no doubt my plan of defence may be alſo objected to. But, as to other matters, I think no one can ſeriouſly deny the truth of what I have ſtated; and yet I know there are ſo few who like to hear truth when it is diſagreeable, that I have doubted whether I ſhould print theſe pages; nothing but a conviction that there are times and caſes (and that the preſent is ſuch a period) in which, however diſagreeable, it ought to be told, could induce me to do ſo. In our preſent ſituation, deception is ruinous.

If there is any thing offenſive in what I have ſaid, or the publication of which is thought to be improper, it was far indeed from my intention

intention to be guilty of either. Every man is called on to give his aſſiſtance; and, having the honor of holding a commiſſion in his Majeſty's army, as alſo ſome ſtake in the country, I am doubly intereſted in its defence.

I ſubmit theſe remarks with every deference, and ſhall conclude, reader, with two lines from Horace:

Vive vale—ſi quid noviſti rectius iſtis
Candidus imperti; ſi non his utere mecum.

FINIS.

# APPENDIX.

ON a revision of this Pamphlet since it came from press; I have thought it proper to observe on some particular points, least an injudicious reader might mistake me. And first in page 4, it may be remarked, that there are several modern as well as ancient follies. It was a perseverance in some of the ancient follies, that made the last war, a war of opinion throughout Europe; and which laid the foundation of what I call modern folly: What I mean, therefore is, that it would be the interest of every state, to profit by the experience of the last fifteen years, and by some revision of laws correct those abuses, which from the natural imperfection of man, must in the course of time get into the best formed constitution.

Page 25—I do not mean that the people of Ireland have any dislike to the form of Government of the English Constitution, which cannot be unpopular;

neither is there any dislike to the persons at *present in* office in Ireland. Latterly we have not had the torture, no burning of houses, nor the rigour and violence of former years; Lord Hardwicke is deservedly respected and esteemed. It is also just to observe, that the rigour beyond law, was first checked by Lord Cornwallis—who much to his credit, never suffered any court-martial sentence to be executed, until he revised the proceedings.* But what I mean is, that the system on which the affairs of Ireland have been in general carried on, is bad. The Irish look on themselves as ill treated in many respects; the public interest has been often sacrifised to the jobs of individuals which altogether has certainly alienated the affections of a great part of the people from the English Government.

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*Sketch of the Conduct of France to other Nations, as promised in page 28.*

In the year 1783, the small state of Geneva was involved in intestine troubles; France encouraged those who wished for a revolution in the Genevan Government, and then abandoned them. She some years after, without any ceremony, annexed that territory to her own dominions.

France

* This was a fortunate circumstance, as Lord C. set aside several of the most shameful and unjust decisions; not but in general the court-martial trial was correct, and preferred by the people to the *Quarter Sessions*.

France in 1789 set out well, resisting an oppressive Government, and soon after departed from all justice, by putting to death the best and most humane King they ever had.——What followed? Power got into the hands of violent men; who in fact held their situations at the will of the mob—the mob are always ferocious and hard to manage; instead of correcting abuses, all order was subverted; a deplorable system of bloody massacre took place, and what does it all end in? A military Despotism. It must however be allowed, that the French people obtained some advantages in the early part of the revolution, such as a reform in the orders of Nobility and Clergy, which were (as is well known) on an entire different footing in that country, from what they are in England. But it is pretty certain that what France gained in point of raform, was not worth what it cost; and after various misfortunes, and calamity to individuals, France is as despotically governed as at any period; the liberty of the press, and of the subject as compleatly put down; and civil institutions superceded by military Despotism. Her conduct to other Nations, *friends or foes* has been marked by enormity and plunder; and in order to investigate the question of how far Ireland could trust France, I shall shortly state it:

1st, In 1788, France encouraged the Dutch to resist the Stadtholder, and after leading them into a

civil war, abandoned them to Prussia, though the least show of support would have prevented such interference ; *vide Segurs memoirs.*

The next measure of the French in modern times, was procuring a revolt in the Netherlands in 1790, (I admit that country was ill treated, and badly governed) and then contrary to promise, withholding any support; and on a second revolt some years after, they do assist them, but also plunder them; take all their pictures, and ultimately incorporate the country with France.

After this, in the east, republican France instigates Tippoo to break with the English, under promise of great assistance; the consequence was, that he having foolishly believed them, and they having totally abandoned him, he was conquered, and his country divided like Poland.

The French go also into Italy. In Piedmont and Savoy they (as they said) declare war against the palace, and assist the cottage. (See their own account on the *Moniteur* of the Times.) They, however, make one of these provinces a French department, and plunder palace and cottage in both.

What is their conduct in Italy under Bonaparte? Venice as the tree of liberty planted in St. Mark's Place—But the black eagle is soon substituted—for Venice is trafficked like a West-India island; and

and this once famous country, without any ceremony, or any consent of its inhabitants, is given by Bonaparte to the Emperor of Germany.*

During all this campaign the peasantry were made to act as pioneers to the French, and if they resisted, they were shot for daring to exert that natural right, and which the French termed rebellion in any but the regular troops.

At Rome the French organized a republic, for which the Romans paid pretty well; for under the pretence of resistance on the part of the Pope, the most *enormous* contributions were raised.

The

* I do not believe the Venetians have ſuffered by the transfer, for they had one of the worſt Governments in the world; but they were not conſulted on the ſubject. Money was extorted from the inhabitants; the municipality forced to pay the French 150,000 ducats, and the corporation of ſilver-ſmiths 30,000 ducats, for protecting their houſes and ſhops from pillage.

I believe it would be an advantage if there was a better diviſion of Europe. The ſmall ſtates will be deſtroyed by France, if they are not united to the more powerful countries;—and poſſibly before long there may be ſuch a change, otherwiſe I do not ſee how the gigantic power of France is to be reſiſted.

Man is in general ſhort-ſighted.—The emperor Joſeph little thought of the miſchief he was about, in deſtroying all the fortifications, and barriers in Flanders and Brabant. William the III. indeed ſeemed to have more forethought, for his entire reign was an effort to curb France, and to deſtroy her ſchemes of aggrandiſement.

The finest pictures, statues, &c. taken; the country so shamefully pillaged as even to cause a remonstrance from some of the officers of the French army; and soon after, the very man who did all this, makes a concordat with his Holiness,—re-establishes the old order, and gives up the Roman republic. They observed, however, an exact discipline in the demi-brigades;—no soldier or subordinate officer dare *take* the smallest article. The plunder was on an enlarged scale, but officers and soldiers were at *free quarters*.

The French army entered Holland in 1794 as friends: but that once great republic, torn to pieces by internal discord, and forgetful of her national motto, "Nam concordia, &c. &c." has been obliged to submit to the most humiliating orders and interference from France.* Spain is almost in the same situation.

* In their firſt proclamation they ſay they enter Holland as friends and allies, to preſerve their independence, and that property ſhould be protected.

Seven days after comes the requiſition;—money, wheat, hay, ſtraw, cloathing of all kinds, and 12,000 oxen: and they tell the Dutch, in caſe all theſe articles are not furniſhed in a month, they ſhould be exacted by force.—Soon after they were obliged to pay them 4 millions ſterling.

The Dutch, notwithſtanding all the violence of party which there was in Holland ſince 1787, never confiſcated any man's property; and the tenantry took no advantage of the times, but paid their landlords.—How few countries can boaſt of ſuch honourable conduct?—They may juſtly be called a civilized nation.

The

The conduct of the French in Egypt was also so outrageous, that the wretched inhabitants were as unhappy under them as under the despotism of the Turks. For the particulars, I refer the reader to *Denon*, who must be admitted to be good authority, and who mentions various atrocities committed by his brethren with a degree of levity scarcely to be believed.

I have heard the French much abused for their conduct in Germany, Switzerland, and latterly in Hanover. I lament it;—but in these cases there was not the same breach of faith as in the other countries I have mentioned. They had no compact with the Germans, so there was no violation; they entered those states with avowed hostility. In respect to Switzerland, their occupation of it was, in a military view, unavoidable. If they had not done so, Austria probably would, which must have been very detrimental to France. However, she was not content with occupying that country;—requisition, internal interference, free quarters, I may say conquest was the consequence.

To return to Italy.—The sovereign and people of that well-governed country, Tuscany, were in perfect amity with France, and indeed with all the world.

I am

I am sorry to say there was other interference besides that of France, which was cruel to such a country; and I shall never justify such conduct; but that of France is in this case particularly in point. Tuscany did all she could to remain neutral;—if her minister, Manfredini, had any leaning, it *was to France.* France could not charge Tuscany with any misconduct; on the contrary, she permitted the French forces to occupy Leghorn. What was her reward?—The French seize Tuscany, drive away the Grand Duke, who lived in harmony with his subjects. They (republicans) change the government against the wishes of the people, and decree a monarchy, placing a prince of Spain on the throne of Etruria. Such conduct to a quiet unoffending state, ought to rouse the resentment of all Europe.

The conduct of the French in the West-Indies, under Victor Hugues at Guadaloupe, and under Le Clerk at St. Domingo, far outdoes for murder, plunder and atrocity, even the horrors of the Spaniards, so feelingly related by Las Casas.—They gave freedom to the Blacks, and put all sorts of strange and mischievous ideas into their heads; but Bonaparte determined that slavery should exist again, and endeavoured to enforce it, or exterminate.

The conduct to Naples has been so black and infamous, that I cannot find words to express my abhorrence of it, and is an awful lesson to other countries how they trust France.

The

The French marched to Naples; there was some spirit of liberty in that country, because there had been a spirit of persecution, which always creates a spirit of opposition; the detail of what happened there would make a volume; suffice it to say, that when the French came to Naples, the King and his court left that city, though requested by the majority of the inhabitants to remain. No man can suppose the French marched to Naples to pay compliments to the King. What therefore followed? His quitting the city was declared an abdication, and a new government was organized—of course democratic—but it is allowed that their regulations were good; no outrages happened then, and it was absolutely necessary to form some government. A turn of affairs two years after, obliged the greatest part of the French army to evacuate Naples. Cardinal Ruffo, commanding the Neapolitan Royalists, a force of Turks, Russians and English, besieged the French and Neapolitan Patriots in the forts of Naples. They capitulate*. The King returns from Sicily. *The capitulation is broke.* Naples is for a time given up to the plunder and fury of the Calabrians. Selections are made from those who *capitulated for liberty to quit the country*, and numbers of them are executed. Among them Francis Bagni, professor of physic; Pascall Buffo;

* The capitulation was signed by the English, Russian and Turkish Commanding Officers, as well as by Cardinal Ruffo.

Buffo; Jos. Loyeteta; Franco Contesti; three distinguished literati; Domenico Correlli, a physician of eminence; Natale, bishop of Pico; M. Geoti, an ecclesiastic:—the above, for being members of the Provisional government, when the former government went off. Eleonora Fonseca, a learned lady; M. Pagano, one of the best Italian writers; Nicol Pacifico; Vino Tresi; Pascal Mateva; the Duke d'Andria; Marquis Guesaro; Marquis de Carletto; V. Bruno Jul. Collona; all men of the best characters and first-rate talents; and many others.

I enter into no argument here on this point, further than to shew the conduct of France.—Bonaparte shortly after this makes peace with the very Government of Naples that broke this capitulation; and far from ever thinking of the unfortunate persons above-mentioned, abandons their relations, whose property was all confiscated, merely having a *loose article*, that *it will be restored.* Considering all the circumstances of Naples, let any one contrast the conduct of the Duke of Tuscany and of the King of Naples, and also the conduct of France to each, and then say what reliance can be placed on French promises.

Two Republicks were also formed in the North of Italy—the Cisalpine and Ligurian. The one was afterwards abolished without ceremony, and the other in

in fact incorporated with France; for Bonaparte without ceremony told their Deputies, that being unfit to govern themselves, he would *take that trouble on himself.*——If all this is not Demonstration of what might be expected from France, it is in vain to argue the point; there is enough to convince any one but a fool, that if the French succeeded in invading Ireland, they would *incorporate* the island with France, if they could: and if not they would traffick it, abandon those who joined them, as at Naples; or after taking all they could, leave them to repent their folly. In short, France would consult her own *convenience only*; but my firm opinion is, that if she could hold Ireland for any time, the British empire and the liberty of Europe would be in great danger.

There is not any thing new in this conduct of France—it was the same in the old wars; Lewis the XIV. committed great destruction; the Palatinate was almost entirely destroyed; the same happened in the Low Countries in 1582 and 3; in the latter year they attacked Antwerp, *against the faith of agreement*, pillaged it, and put most of the inhabitants to the sword. An account of their misconduct in Holland in 1673, was published in a quarto volume, viz.: Avis fidele aux veritables Hollandois, de ce qui c'est passé dans les villages de Bodegrave, et Swammerdam, et les cruautes enormés que les Francois y ont exercées.

The

The book has several etchings by Romain de Hooge. It begins thus:

What the French have done in this country in one year, exceeds in cruelty whatever any historian has ever said of any nation. There is no pen or pencil to be found that can describe it; perpetrated not only in towns that were conquered, but in those that were merely occupied by the troops of France.

So that under every form of government, we have seen that France cannot be trusted; and the history of the world proves the folly of any nation calling on, or allowing foreigners to come and settle their domestic differences.

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Page 52.—What is mentioned at the end of the note in this page, is not in the slightest degree meant as any disrepect to the church; it was mentioned under the idea that as the mass of the people are of a different religion, and the public burthens high, it was not a fit moment to tax them for building churches, and particularly as there are funds for the purpose.

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What is mentioned in page 58, may appear a contradiction to what I recommend in page 37. The one

one is a mere local business, absolutely necessary and possible; but a general measure of the sort (as mentioned in page 58) is unnecessary, and in Ireland impossible.

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Page 76, a true union, &c.—It may be said that this expression is too indefinite, and therefore what is meant by it? I answer, that in my humble opinion, among other obvious things to be done for the benefit, and towards a consolidation of affection between England and Ireland, the following would ensure it:

A repeal of the remaining Penal Laws against Roman Catholics.

A commutation of Tythes, by some arrangement under which the Clergy of the Establishment would not suffer any injustice.

Classification and payment by the State of the Catholic Clergy, upon such conditions as should ensure their satisfaction, and the tranquility of the country.

A legal Provision for the Poor, but not by any means on the plan of the English Poor Laws, as at present arranged.

An interchangeable Militia, against which there is not any rational or solid odjection.

An attention to the morals of the People, by the prohibition of the *home* consumption of whiskey, and

and some diffusion of education by a reform of the Charter, and other Schools of the country.

A revison of the Act Union, and particularly to consider how far the terms of it are fair and equitable in respect to the proportion of taxation established for Ireland.

Lastly—Some *residence* from the Absentees.

The above with the correction of some lesser abuses and jobs, (as we call them in Ireland) would in a short time, give a true Union, and with that content; and would add considerably to the strength of the empire.

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It may be asked here, as well as in reference to page 80, how compel residence?

Certainly not by Act of Parliament, though so far as an act to tax Absentees, I see nothing arbitrary in it; or if the great proprietors were obliged to make Ireland their *country residence* for even four months in the year, under penalty of a quarter of their income to the state, it would occasion a great change, and eight months might do for pleasure in London. Some money would then be spent in improvements which would give bread to their poorer tenantry; and the force of example in civilized manners

ners would be of advantage; they would become more identified with their tenantry, and while on the one hand, they could protect them against the tyranny of petty country gentlemen; in return they would have their gratitude—they would have their estates under their own eyes—and also have that grateful pleasure of contributing to the comfort and happiness of those who cultivate the lands from which they draw their subsistence. It is also important for them and for government to consider how a country can go on remitting 3,000,000*l.* a year to Absentees, and 1,300,000*l.* interest of Loan to London, if the balance of trade is against it, which many assert was positively the case, as to Ireland, for the last year, ending 5th January, 1804.

This balance, however, as arising from an excess of exports over imports, was stated by the Inspector of imports and exports to be 900,000*l.* in favour of Ireland, for the year ending 5th January, 1803. But every body admits, that its *balance of remittance* is considerably against it.

FINIS.

The reader will excuſe ſome repetitions—the preſs was diſperſed before they were perceived.

## ERRATA.

P. 10, for *Fountenoy*, read *Fontenoy*.
—19, for *Potion*, read *Poſition*.
—ib. in note, for *juſtneſſes*, read *faſtneſſes*.
—21, in note, for *Banagher* 1500, *Birr* 1500, read *Banagher* 1000, *Birr* 1000, *Tullamore* 1000.
—31, for *Clogher*, read *Clogheen*.
—26, line 10, for *with*, read *in*.

last date